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entwickelt. Dies birgt die Gefahr, dass die negativen Auswirkungen der Aktivitäten von Unternehmen
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globalized economy, the prevention by law of negative externalities of business activities is difficult and
in many instances even impossible. Furthermore, business firms increasingly assume tasks that are tra-
ditionally regarded as the responsibilities of national governments, such as the provision of public and
regulation. Taken together, these developments indicate that the balance of power between business firms
and governments has shifted in favour of the former. In this dissertation I first analyse the implications
of an increasing importance of business contributions to public policy. As the influence of business firms
in society is increasing, a predominance of economic reasoning as a guiding principle for societal coor-
dination is increasingly likely. Due to a potential disregard of the negative effects of business activities
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
The power of business firms has grown considerably in the current globalized economy 
(Barley, 2007; Beck, 2000). Simultaneously, the power of nation states to regulate business 
has diminished (Habermas, 2001; Strange, 2000). Whereas the influence of national 
governments is limited to their respective territory, many business firms are to a considerable 
extent globally mobile. Consequently, the prevention by law of negative externalities of 
business activities such as environmental pollution or the violation of human rights in global 
value chains is difficult and in many instances even impossible. For example, while numerous 
international major fashion brands are involved in the recent disasters in garment factories in 
Bangladesh (Gayle, 2013), legal prosecution is limited to local actors (Huffington Post, 2013). 
Furthermore, business firms increasingly assume tasks that are traditionally regarded as the 
responsibilities of democratically elected national governments, such as the provision of 
public goods (e.g. in the cases of business firms providing infrastructure or public services) 
and regulation (in the case of business regulation through private standards). In these cases 
business firms assume a political role. However, they often lack democratic legitimation for 
such activities. Taken together, these developments indicate that the balance of power 
between business firms and governments has shifted in favour of the former (Goldblatt et al., 
1997). At a first glance, this claim is contradicted by tightened regulation in areas such as 
financial markets (European Parliament, 2010a; Moloney, 2010) and disclosure practices of 
business firms (Kinderman, 2013) in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 as well as by 
recent plans of the OECD to tackle the problem of tax avoidance (Inman, 2013; see also 
Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010). These developments suggest that governments and 
international organizations are capable and willing to regulate the conduct of business firms. 
However, at a second glance, political decisions are still strongly influenced by lobbying and 
agenda setting activities of business firms (Barley, 2007; Crouch, 2011; Nownes, 2006) and 
the regulatory adjustments of the financial system are rather fragmentary with the institutional 
frameworks left unchanged (Froud et al., 2012; Hellwig, 2010). These issues suggest that a  
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strengthened involvement of civil society in political decision processes (Crouch, 2011) and 
the redesign of oversight mechanisms according to democratic principles (Engelen et al., 
2012) are preconditions for a thorough structural reform of the financial sector as well as of 
the economy as a whole. 
An emerging body of research (Matten & Crane, 2005; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; 
Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011) is turning attention to 
the changing role of business firms in a globalized world, analysing different facets of this 
development. Adding to this literature, in this dissertation I first analyse the implications of an 
increasing importance of business contributions to public policy. Currently, business firms 
assume more and more tasks that are traditionally regarded as the domain of governments. 
Therefore, a predominance of economic reasoning as a guiding principle for societal 
coordination is increasingly likely. Due to a potential disregard of the negative effects of 
business activities on individuals and the natural environment, such a predominance might 
jeopardize the stability of society. Consequently, I argue that it is necessary to critically assess 
the engagement of business firms in activities beyond their generic economic operations and, 
on this basis, to develop measures aimed at reconciling the interests of business (such as 
favourable regulations and low taxes) and the interests of less powerful members of society 
(such as social security, labour rights, and consumer protection) in cases where the latter are 
negatively affected by the former. That is, on the one hand, the principles of the market 
economy should be harnessed to accomplish the efficient allocation of resources. On the other 
hand, there is a need to prevent potentially negative effects of business activities, however 
without impairing the functionality of the economic system, thus balancing economic and 
social considerations. Secondly, I show that such balancing necessitates the reconsideration of 
the theory and practice of corporate governance. In a major part of research corporate 
governance is defined as the set of rules and processes aimed at the protection of the owners 
of a corporation’s shares. This special protection is justified by the assumption that all non-
shareowning stakeholders of a business firm are protected by explicit contracts, which are 
legally enforceable (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). By contrast, 
shareholders need to rely on corporate managers to generate a return on their investments. 
Based on these considerations, the dominant approach to corporate governance, which mainly 
builds on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the assumption of the existence of an 
efficient market for corporate control (Manne, 1965), postulates that any management 
decision needs to regard the maximization of shareholder value as the ultimate objective. As  
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research has shown, such a narrow focus harbours the danger of negative effects on the 
natural environment (Rose, 2007) as well as on non-shareowning stakeholders in general 
(Tirole, 2001) and employees in particular (Ireland, 2005; McSweeny, 2008). I suggest that, 
besides novel forms of governmental and transnational regulation, the opening up of corporate 
governance for democratic processes is one way to tackle such problems. In the following 
section I will summarize the three essays of the dissertation. Subsequently, I will discuss the 
major contributions and describe avenues for further research. 
1.2 Summary of the Three Essays 
The first essay, which is single-authored, investigates the potentials and pitfalls of business 
contributions to the public good. Furthermore, it responds to the call for research on the 
‘desirability of the mechanisms through which citizens can participate in and even control 
corporations to ensure that their rights are adequately protected’ (Matten & Crane, 2005: 176). 
This essay primarily builds on the ideas of the economic sociologist Karl Polanyi. He 
observed that the expansion of the market system based on the principles of economic 
liberalism has the tendency to treat all factors of production – labour, land, and money – as 
fictitious commodities, i.e. as commodities which are ‘treated as if they had been produced for 
sale’ (Polanyi, 1977: 10), with potentially disastrous consequences for societal stability 
(Polanyi, 1957). These negative consequences result from disregarding the non-economic 
prerequisites for the stability of society such as intact social relations and the integrity of the 
natural environment. Polanyi argues, that – as a response to the threat to societal stability by 
this commodification – ‘society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating 
market’ (Polanyi, 1957: 76) by means such as trade unions and factory laws aimed at the 
protection of the factors of production from exclusive domination by the forces of the free 
market. The conflict between economic liberalism, aimed at the expansion of the principles of 
free market capitalism, and social protectionism, aimed at the partial protection of the factors 
of production from the forces of the market, has been termed double-movement by Polanyi. 
Most prominently, in the post-World War II regulatory architecture economic liberalism was 
first domesticated by strong welfare states, which aimed at the de-commodification – that is, 
the partial protection from market forces – of labour (Esping-Andersen, 1990) (albeit to a 
different degree; see Blyth, 2002). Second, Keynesian economic policies aimed at correcting 
market imbalances (Ruggie, 1982), thus ensuring economic stability and social security. With 
increasing levels of governmental debt (see, e.g., Habermas, 1989; Streeck, 2013) 
  
4 
  
governments proved more and more incapable of maintaining a strong welfare state and 
demand-centred economic policies. Further, with the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant 
paradigm in public policy (Harvey, 2005) governments became more and more unwilling to 
pursue these objectives (Crouch, 2011). In this situation, the contributions of business firms to 
the public good become significant. Business firms always contributed to the common good 
beyond their genuine societal function of value generation, e.g. through enhanced worker 
protection and the provision of old age benefits, housing, and schooling. Such engagement is 
referred to as patronism or welfare capitalism in the early 20th century and as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in the present. With business firms complementing or even substituting 
governmental contributions to the public good, the question emerges whether the current 
social engagement of business firms can serve as a practical remedy for the negative effects of 
economic liberalism. Against this historical backdrop, I show that in the academic discourse 
on the social engagement of business – in the early times of modern capitalism as well as at 
the present time – the social engagement of business is, on the one hand, affirmatively 
conceptualized in accordance with the principles of economic liberalism (see, Porter & 
Kramer, 2006, 2011). From this instrumental perspective, CSR is regarded as a means to 
contribute to the generation of profit. On the other hand, from a critical perspective, the social 
engagement of business is conceived as a means to advance the predominance of business in 
society to the disadvantage of many stakeholders (Banerjee, 2008; Shamir, 2008), if 
exclusively accomplished according to economic considerations. However, if the observance 
of the interests of less powerful actors is guaranteed – ideally on the basis of democratic 
processes –, CSR can serve as a prosocial countermovement that aims to ameliorate the 
negative effects of economic activity on society (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Acknowledging 
that all these perspectives are valid descriptions of specific facets of the increasing 
engagement of business in social issues, I show that CSR can be understood as being shaped 
by the Polanyian double-movement. That is, through CSR business firms potentially pursue 
instrumental or prosocial objectives, or even both objectives simultaneously. On this basis I 
argue that while social engagement by business appears to be an increasingly important 
contribution to the public good, it nevertheless needs to be under close and continuous 
scrutiny regarding its positive and negative effects. 
This essay makes two contributions. First, I illustrate that both critical (see, e.g., 
Banerjee, 2008; Shamir, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and affirmative perspectives on CSR 
(see, e.g., Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011) provide valid – and  
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even complementary – analyses of the role of business in current society. On the one hand, an 
affirmative perspective on CSR has the potential to elaborate business policies that take into 
account the broadened responsibilities of business which result from a shift of power between 
business and governments. On the other hand, critical approaches to CSR are necessary 
elements of a comprehensive evaluation of the phenomenon of CSR. Such approaches have 
the potential to highlight problematic aspects such as an excessive concentration on CSR 
activities that are immediately economically beneficial and the disregard of powerless 
stakeholders. Second, and based on these considerations, I suggest the Polanyian concept of 
de-commodification, that is, the partial protection of individuals and the natural environment 
from market forces, as a normative evaluation criterion for the CSR activities of business 
firms. Accordingly, it is necessary to guarantee a balance of liberal tendencies in CSR that 
regard CSR as a means to expand market forces in areas of society hitherto untapped by 
capitalism (see, e.g., Khanna et al., 2005; Porter & Kramer, 2011), and approaches that regard 
CSR as a means to fill institutional voids (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). More concretely, 
building on the Polanyian political project that comprises governmental regulation of business 
as well as the democratic co-determination of business firms (Dale, 2010; Ebner, 2010), I 
suggest measures – both on the level of the business firm and on the level of regulation – 
which might be appropriate for reconciling economic and social considerations in the social 
engagement of business and for safeguarding that business firms constructively interact with 
society. 
The second essay, co-authored with Andreas Georg Scherer and Dorothée Baumann-
Pauly, looks at the democratic deficit that results when business firms engage in public policy. 
Such an engagement consists either in the provision of global public goods and the provision 
of rights (corporate citizenship) or the direct influence on the political system (corporate 
political activities), with the aim of furthering business interests. We argue that both types of 
activities potentially threaten the legitimacy, i.e. the social acceptance, of business firms. This 
is because in both cases business firms exercise power without any democratic legitimation, 
i.e. without formal authorization or control. Building on a broad definition of corporate 
governance that regards corporate governance as structures and processes aimed at balancing 
the interests of corporations and society (Cadbury, 2003), thus securing the consent of 
stakeholders to the activities of business (Gomez & Korine, 2005), we examine the 
implications of these developments for corporate governance. We argue that in different 
stages in the development of modern capitalism business firms faced different distinct  
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challenges for their social acceptance: autocratic power relations within business firms 
operating in increasingly democratic environments; the growth of modern vertically 
integrated corporations; the increasing power of financial markets; the growing importance of 
knowledge as a production factor; and the increasing engagement of business in public policy 
under conditions of decreasing power of national governments, a situation which we refer to 
as post-Westphalian (see, e.g., Falk, 2002). In line with configurational theory (Doty & Glick, 
1994; Miller, 1981, 1987; Weber, 1922/1978), we conceptualize several ideal-typical forms of 
corporate governance that can be regarded as responses to these challenges: familial corporate 
governance, managerial corporate governance, shareholder- and stakeholder-centred corporate 
governance, and corporate governance structures that aim at the participation of knowledge 
workers. We argue that the democratic deficit resulting from corporate citizenship and 
corporate political activities can be regarded as a relatively novel challenge for the legitimacy 
and, ultimately, for the survival of business firms. Accordingly, we describe a new form of 
corporate governance – democratic corporate governance. The main feature of this ideal type 
is the internalization of democratic processes within a business firm as a means to maintain or 
re-establish corporate legitimacy. Within the scope of a case study, we trace the development 
of the governance structures of the cement producer Lafarge since its founding in 1833. We 
argue that Lafarge, facing many of the challenges described above, implemented elements of 
the ideal-typical forms of corporate governance. In particular, we show that the establishment 
of a stakeholder panel in which representatives of civil society organizations meet with 
Lafarge’s executive committee and the CEO can be interpreted as a partial democratization of 
corporate governance, with the aim to remedy the incapacity of other types of corporate 
governance to appropriately respond to the challenges of a post-Westphalian business 
environment. 
The first contribution of this essay is the application of the configurational approach to 
corporate governance. We show how contingent forms of corporate governance can be 
understood as the response of business firms to contextual conditions. Furthermore, whereas 
most work in the configurational tradition (e.g. Doty & Glick, 1994; Payne, 2006) regards the 
financial performance of business firms as the only evaluation criterion for the efficiency of 
specific structures, we suggest legitimacy as an equally important success factor. Thus it 
becomes possible to gain a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of corporate 
governance structures and processes. As the second contribution – linking the academic 
debates on corporate citizenship, corporate political activities, and corporate governance – we 
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describe the implications of the currently shifting balance of power between business firms 
and governments for corporate governance. 
 The third essay, co-authored with Andreas Georg Scherer, examines corporate 
governance from the perspective of the allocation of risk resulting from business activities. 
One of the main justifications for the centrality of shareholders in the traditional approach to 
corporate governance in research and practice is the risk borne by shareholders. Whereas all 
other stakeholders of a business firm are regarded to be parties to explicit contracts and 
therefore protected by the law, shareholders need to rely on managers to generate enough 
returns so that shareholders get a profit after the settlement of all contractual claims vis-à-vis a 
firm. That is, they are entitled to hold residual claims. Since this profit cannot be guaranteed a 
priori, they hold a residual risk that is regarded as the justification for the right to appropriate 
the residual claims. In this essay we argue that the assumption of shareholders as residual risk 
takers becomes untenable in light of globalization and the associated decline of the regulatory 
power of nation states on the one hand and the increase in the power of business firms on the 
other hand. Value chains often reach to areas with low or non-existing labour standards, 
negative externalities such as environmental pollution matter globally, and business firms 
acquire immense power by assuming tasks originally executed by democratically elected 
governments. As a result, more and more stakeholders of business firms are exposed to risks 
resulting from business activities without legal protection – with negative effects on the 
legitimacy of business firms and ultimately threatening their survival. As observed by Beck 
(1992, 1999), this reallocation of risk from the level of society to that of the individuals can be 
regarded as a main characteristic of contemporary society which is therewith becoming a risk 
society. Business firms produce many risks which are constitutive for risk society (Gephart, 
Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 2009). Consequently, the concentration of corporate 
governance on shareholders seems to be inappropriate in a risk society. We argue that, 
instead, corporate governance should ensure the protection of all stakeholders who are 
exposed to the risk that results from the activities of business firms, and who are not 
sufficiently protected by law. We suggest that the democratization of corporate governance 
structures along the lines of the principles of deliberative democracy might be a viable way to 
adapt corporate governance to the conditions of a risk society. Accordingly, civil society 
organizations should take part in the governance processes of business firms and advocate 
stakeholders that are negatively affected by the activities of business. We show that 
stakeholder panels, which are currently being set up in many multinational corporations as  
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fora for the discussion of issues such as pollution and labour standards, can be interpreted as 
moves towards more democratic governance structures. We explain these developments as 
attempts by business firms to address risks, which are caused by the business firms and are 
only insufficiently addressed by regulatory frameworks. By this means business firms can 
maintain or restore their legitimacy. 
As a first contribution, we add to the growing amount of criticism (see, e.g., Blair, 
2003; Davis, 2011; McSweeny, 2008) of the shareholder-centred approach to corporate 
governance. This approach is still dominant in the majority of research (Judge, 2009), in the 
practice of corporate governance (Davis, 2009), and in corporate governance regulation (Hilb, 
2012). We show that the justification of the centrality of shareholders as bearers of residual 
risk in corporate governance becomes untenable in the light of the centrality of business firms 
in a risk society. With this line of reasoning we complement the second essay by elaborating a 
critique of the theoretical underpinnings of the shareholder-centred approach to corporate 
governance. In addition, we argue that alternative approaches to corporate governance, such 
as team production theory (Blair, 1995) and a property rights approach to governance (Asher, 
Mahoney, & Mahoney, 2005), that advocate the inclusion in corporate governance of all 
stakeholders who have contractual ties with a firm are not able to take into account the 
unilateral exercise of power of business firms, which is characteristic for global business 
activities in a risk society. As a second contribution, we show that the democratization of 
corporate governance might be self-enforcing to some extent. We justify this claim by arguing 
that, in light of increasing societal sensitivity for corporate wrongdoing and growing 
resistance against unjust business practices, a partial democratization of corporate governance 
might be the only means for business firms to maintain or restore legitimacy in absence of 
functioning regulatory frameworks that partly compensated for the risk produced by business 
firms. In summary, this essay makes clear that theorizing on corporate governance needs to 
take into account the changing allocation of risk in the current society. At the same time, we 
make clear that research on an appropriate handling of risks in a risk society is incomplete 
without a reconsideration of the role of business in general and the role of corporate 
governance in particular. 
1.3 Discussion and Avenues for Further Research 
As an overarching topic, in my dissertation I analyse the implications of a shifting balance of 
power between public actors (i.e. governments) and private actors (i.e. business firms) both on 
  
9 
  
the level of academic discourse and on the level of the governance structures of business 
firms. First, I show that a predominance of neoliberal tendencies that aim at the expansion of 
market forces and a disregard of social protectionist tendencies that aim at buffering society 
from the detrimental effects of unbridled capitalism are potentially problematic for business 
firms as well as for society as a whole. Approaches that conceptualize CSR exclusively as a 
means to generate profits (see, e.g., Mc Williams & Siegel, 2001; Porter & Kramer, 2006, 
2011) might hence have a negative effect on the public good (see, e.g., Gond, Palazzo, & 
Basu, 2009). Rather, with increased power of business in society comes increased 
responsibility, which needs to be reflected in the approaches that firms formulate for their 
engagement in activities that are traditionally regarded as the domain of governments. 
Consequently, in all three essays I argue that a constant scrutiny of the activities of business 
firms and, on this basis, a balancing of both liberal and prosocial tendencies is necessary to 
maintain the stability of society at large (in essay one) and to safeguard the legitimacy and 
viability of business firms (in essay two and three), ideally according to democratic principles. 
Second, the issue of corporate control is particularly relevant in the area of corporate 
governance, where ideas of economic liberalism materialize in a concentration on the interests 
of shareholders with potentially negative effects for other stakeholders. The potential of 
democratic processes to domesticate the power of business and to tackle legitimacy problems 
of firms has been elaborated in the extant literature (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007). Extending this stream of research, the second and the third essay of the 
dissertation adapt these ideas to corporate governance. Both essays, albeit with a different 
focus (democratic deficits of corporate activities in essay two and a reallocation of risk in 
essay three), conceptualize democratic corporate governance as a means to balance the 
interests of different stakeholders if businesses operate outside functioning regulatory 
frameworks and governments fail to protect non-shareowning stakeholders. Obviously, a 
comprehensive democratization of organizational decision-making is not likely to be viable 
and might even be undesirable. However, one central point of this dissertation is that in cases 
such as the operation of a business firm outside of functioning regulatory frameworks a partial 
democratization of corporate governance is one way to avoid unfair treatment of 
organizational stakeholders and to thus tackle legitimacy deficits of business firms. Even if 
morally sound behaviour of corporate managers can be expected in most cases (see, e.g., 
Ghoshal, 2005; Osterloh & Frey, 2004), resulting in a fair treatment of all organizational 
stakeholders without reference to legal prescriptions, law often guides managerial behaviour  
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in an indirect manner through the creation of social pressure and the shaping of individual 
preferences (Franck, 2013). Law can thus be regarded as fulfilling a ‘sheep dog’ function 
(Rock & Waechter, 2001). However, when regulatory frameworks are weak or absent, law is 
unavailable to fulfil this function. In this case, the partial inclusion of stakeholders in  
organizational oversight processes might work as an alternative ‘sheep dog’. 
Third, essays one and three point out measures for indirectly tackling problematic 
aspects of business activities by means of regulation. Many multinational corporations are 
based in countries with relatively strong law enforcement. However, such firms often operate 
in regions with weak regulatory frameworks, either directly or through intricate global value 
chains. Domestic law in the home countries of these corporations can prevent or compensate 
the negative effects of business activities in these regions only to a limited extent. Further, as 
only states are subject to international law, business firms cannot be sued for the violation of 
international law. However, domestic law might first mandate governance structures that, e.g., 
include representatives of civil society on corporate boards. Improved oversight mechanisms 
within business firms might thus prevent corporate wrongdoing. Second, domestic and 
international regulation might require CSR activities as well as accountability and 
transparency measures that enable the public to comprehensively judge business conduct. 
Such mechanisms aimed at balancing the interests of different stakeholders in an indirect 
manner are illustrated by the recent proposal for a EU directive requiring large corporations to 
disclose non-financial information (European Commission, 2013) as well as by the aim of the 
European parliament to include CSR clauses into all EU trade agreements (European 
Parliament, 2010b). Even if most emerging CSR policies are not strictly legally binding 
(Steurer, 2010), these developments indicate that there are more and more incentives for 
business firms to integrate CSR in their business practices. As a consequence, the 
considerations of this dissertation on the necessity to balance instrumental and prosocial 
aspects of CSR as well as the implications of this necessity for corporate governance are 
becoming relevant for more and more business firms. 
The findings of my dissertation give rise to a number of important avenues for further 
research. First, on the one hand democratic processes have the potential to contribute to 
organizational legitimacy (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). On the other hand, inefficiencies could 
potentially result from a broad representation of stakeholder interests in corporate governance 
(Franck, 2011; Thompson, 2008). It is of utmost importance to develop concrete suggestions 
for the design of improved governance mechanisms (Walgenbach, 2011) that take into 
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account the potentials as well as the pitfalls of democratic forms of decision-making in 
business firms. Such suggestions might build on ideas to design organizations on the basis of 
cybernetic principles. For instance, considerations of requisite variety in systems for tackling 
environmental complexity (Ashby, 1956) and the concept of circular organizing as a means to 
overcome the flaws of strictly hierarchical organizations (Romme, 1999; Romme & 
Endenburg, 2006) might add to the understanding of the challenges resulting from the 
increasingly political role of firms, with regard to business in general and to corporate 
governance in particular. Building on these ideas, new approaches to corporate governance 
(see, e.g., Gomez & Korine, 2008; Pirson & Turnbull, 2011; Turnbull, 1994) might more 
effectively address the interests of diverse stakeholders, the specific characteristics and 
contextual conditions of corporations, and simultaneously minimize inefficiencies that 
potentially result from rent-seeking behaviour and excessive political bargaining that are 
characteristic for broad collective decision processes. 
Second, future research on business and corporate governance should integrate 
findings from studies on the democratization of science (Bäckstrand, 2003; McCormick, 
2007). This stream of research analyses how social movements contest and reframe scientific 
knowledge. In the context of business and corporate governance, these insights might suggest 
concrete forms of cooperation between civil society, business, and governmental and 
transnational regulatory agencies. Furthermore, they might provide a deeper understanding of 
the preconditions for and dynamics of a change of dominant perspectives. Such an 
understanding could facilitate a change of the neoliberal paradigm, which is enduringly 
predominant in business and public policy (Crouch, 2007, 2011). Finally, as business studies 
and economics extensively shape social life, a democratization of these streams of research 
along the lines of the democratic science movement might be desirable in order to guarantee a 
balancing of the societal forces of economic liberalism and social protectionism already 
identified by Polanyi. In a similar vein, the integration of findings from research on 
transdisciplinarity (see, e.g., Pohl, 2008; Wickson, Carew, & Russell, 2006), which calls for a 
broad participation of stakeholders in research projects as a precondition for socially 
acceptable research results, might be integrated in research on business and economics with 
the aim of critically reconsidering current business practices as well as dominant paradigms 
such as competitive advantage and growth. 
A third avenue for further research is the thorough analysis of existing democratic 
structures and processes in business firms in the context of a changing role of business in 
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society. There are several democratically organized business firms (e.g. Semco in Brasil) as 
well as cooperatives with different forms and extent of democratic participation – about 9600 
in Switzerland alone (Swissinfo, 2013), with Migros as the most prominent example, or the 
Mondragon cooperative in Spain. What is lacking are comprehensive empirical studies on 
issues such as the capacity of democratic decision-processes in such organizations to address 
potentially contradictory demands of firm-internal and firm-external stakeholders and possible 
discrepancies between declared policies and actual processes. As stated in the latest EU 
strategy for CSR, the governance and ownership structures of cooperatives might be 
‘especially conducive to responsible business conduct’ (European Commission, 2011: 6). 
Therefore, it is crucial to complement extant research on democratically organized firms (see, 
e.g., Rothschild & Witt, 1986; Wilkinson et al., 2010) by analysing how such firms design 
their CSR activities and their relationship to the political system and to what extent they 
actually succeed in observing the interests of diverse stakeholders. 
The current theory of the firm is mainly focused on the interests of shareholders 
(Davis, 2011). The lessons to be learnt from the findings of this dissertation as well as from 
the future studies envisaged above might be important building blocks for a theory of the firm 
that transcends this narrow focus. Such an advanced theory might take into account the 
changing division of labour and power between governments and business firms (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2006) and make possible to open firms for legitimate claims of 
various stakeholders without impairing economic efficiency. There is obvious need to guide 
the ‘current economic transition in a more humane direction’ (Davis, 2010: 347), and a theory 
of the firm oriented towards the ideas described above might contribute to this objective. 
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Abstract 
In the work of Karl Polanyi, the negative effects of a self-regulating market economy are 
described as being limited by societal forces such as the policies of the welfare state. With the 
decline of the modern welfare state since the late 1970s, social activities of business firms are 
increasingly regarded as an important complement to or even as a substitute for welfare state 
policies by a part of the literature. However, and controversially, another stream of 
argumentation regards these activities as being aimed at advancing the reach of market forces. 
To fully grasp the ambiguous nature of the social activities of business, in this paper I provide 
an account of affirmative as well as of critical interpretations of these activities throughout the 
history of modern capitalism. On this basis, the power of critique to disentangle the diverse 
motivations which underlie the social engagement of business is highlighted as a condition for 
facilitating a role of business in society that balances economic and social considerations. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between business and society is usually analyzed from the perspective of the 
market economy, with neo-classical economics as the dominant paradigm. Accordingly, the 
nation state provides public goods and resolves externality issues, and firms have the clear-cut 
task of value creation. However, beyond this task, since the advent of modern capitalism and 
the concomitant emergence of modern business firms, firms engage in social and public issues 
to a varying degree. In the past such activities have been referred to as patronism or welfare 
capitalism. The terms for modern forms of corporate social engagement are corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), corporate citizenship and similar concepts, and will be referred to under 
the umbrella term of CSR in the following (see Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Some authors argue 
that CSR – conceptualized appropriately – is completely compatible with a purely economic 
role of business (Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011), since, by contributing to the public good, it 
provides further opportunities for profit generation. However, despite the lengthy quest for the 
‘business case for CSR’ (Buehler & Shetty, 1976; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), no 
convincing evidence for the positive effect of such activities on corporate revenues has so far 
been found (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Therefore, a fraction of the debate about corporate 
responsibility regards CSR to be incompatible with the dominant theory of the market, namely 
neoclassical theory with respect to foundational assumptions about the nature of man, the 
nature of the market, and the way markets work (Dubbink, 2004). Rather, CSR is 
conceptualized as an attempt to domesticate economic rationality (see, e.g., Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011). More critically, CSR is even regarded as fully embedded in the neoliberal 
rules and scripts (Shamir, 2010; see also Banerjee, 2007; Kinderman, 2012).  
 Acknowledging the partial validity of each of these streams of argumentation, this 
article aims at elaborating a framework that simultaneously allows the consideration of 
affirmative and critical views on CSR. Obviously, two competing logics are at play within 
CSR: an instrumental logic with the aim of value maximization as well as ‘a prosocial logic 
that differs fundamentally from narrow self-interest’ (Suchman, 1995: 579), as it is aimed at 
enhancing moral legitimacy and contributing to the public good (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). 
Thus, it is obvious that the explanation of CSR needs to be grounded in an approach that 
simultaneously observes instrumental logic and prosocial logic. Further, to gauge the 
relevance of CSR for the public good, it is necessary to simultaneously look at CSR and state-
based measures, which are traditionally regarded as dealing with the public good (see, e.g., 
Baumol, 1974). 
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 To this end, the approach outlined in this paper refers to the work of Polanyi (1957), 
who claims that an expanding self-regulating market has the tendency to affect society 
negatively. As a reaction, society tends to constrain capitalism. Employing the terminology of 
Polanyi on the issue of CSR, CSR can either be regarded as pursuing objectives similar to the 
welfare state (reducing the negative effects of market forces) or as antagonistic to these 
objectives (furthering of market forces). To avoid a simplistic either/or perspective in the 
analysis of CSR, I suggest to conceptualize CSR as being simultaneously shaped by the 
instrumental forces of the market and the prosocial forces of society (see also Levy & Kaplan, 
2008). The simultaneous realization of both these forces in CSR can be understood as the 
intra-organizational materialization of the conflict between the societal organizational 
principles of economic liberalism and social protectionism characteristic of modern 
capitalism, which has been termed the ‘double movement’ by Polanyi (1957). To illustrate the 
materialization of this double movement on the level of the activities of business firms, I 
provide an account of affirmative and critical interpretations of the engagement of business 
throughout the history of modern capitalism and suggest the integration of both perspectives. 
Thus it becomes possible to critically reflect the ambiguous nature of CSR and to 
comprehensively grasp the impact of this engagement on the public good. Such a change of 
perspective seems to be crucial in light of the diminishing capacity of modern welfare states to 
buffer society from the negative effects of capitalism and the concomitantly expanding 
engagement in public policy by business firms. On the basis of these considerations, the 
critique of CSR will be conceptualized as a decisive factor that can contribute to balancing 
liberal and prosocial tendencies of CSR. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent section, the 
Polanyian view on the potentially destabilizing effects of capitalism on social order and the 
resulting self-protection of society will be delineated. Next I will describe both the advent of 
the modern welfare state as a means to reconcile different interests in democratic states – and 
as the main mechanism aimed at buffering society from the negative effects of capitalism – as 
well as its retreat since the 1970s. Subsequently, to illustrate the ambiguity of the social 
activities of business, the co-evolution of these activities and the social policies of the welfare 
state will be reconstructed from an affirmative as well as from a critical perspective. Thus, the 
importance of CSR for the public good will be described as varying with the rise and decline 
of the welfare state in developed countries. In addition, I apply my argument to corporate 
activity in regions with insufficient social protection. Particularly in these regions CSR  
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activities, such as the protection of human rights, are of eminent significance and business 
firms wield enormous influence on the public good – for better or for worse. Based on these 
considerations, the crucial role of critique for revealing socially harmful tendencies in CSR 
and for inducing an alignment of CSR with the public good will be emphasized. In the 
concluding section I provide a brief summary and point out avenues for further research. 
2.2 The Economy, the State, and the Public Good: A Polanyian 
Perspective 
During the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century it had already become clear that the 
market economy alone could not provide all the conditions necessary to make markets 
function. In economic and political theory this problem gained considerable prominence. Even 
if mainstream neoclassical economics completely disregards this problem, the fact that the 
long-term negative effects of capitalism have been brought up by authors from diverse 
traditions in economics and political science demonstrates the relevance of this issue. For 
example, Schumpeter (1975) explained how capitalism is unstable due to its inherent tendency 
to destroy the societal conditions that facilitate its existence. In a similar vein, Roepke, one of 
the founding fathers of the German social market economy, stated that capitalism does not 
have the capacity to produce its moral foundations, and if these foundations are not otherwise 
safeguarded, the free market economy as well as the free societies depending on this economic 
system are doomed to collapse (Roepke, 1958). Polanyi described the need for societal self-
protection against the destructive side-effects of the self-regulating system of the market 
economy, such as growing poverty, inhumane working and housing conditions, and high 
workplace accident rates (Polanyi, 1957), materializing in different forms such as social 
legislation and the right to unionize throughout the history of capitalism (Polanyi, 1957). The 
following considerations mainly refer to the ideas of Polanyi, who depicts the 
commodification – that is, the complete submission to the laws of supply and demand – of 
money, land and labour as the precondition for the emergence of the system of a self-
regulating market (which he regards as utopian in its pure form, since it ‘could not exist for 
any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society’ (Polanyi, 
1957: 3). Polanyi holds that a self-regulating market system can only function if it treats its 
constituent components as fictitious commodities, i.e. as commodities which are ‘treated as if 
they had been produced for sale. Of course, they were not actually commodities, since they 
were either not produced at all (like land) or, if so, not for sale (like labor)’ (Polanyi, 1977: 
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10). Such a commodification necessarily disregards the manifold aspects of social life and the 
embeddedness of economic action in social contexts and, by doing so, can lead to the 
disintegration of social relationships and to the degradation of the environment, making it a 
potential threat to societal stability (Ebner, 2010). Whereas more recent approaches (e.g. 
Granovetter, 1985) regard embeddedness as the influence of social facts on economic 
transactions, in the work of Polanyi embeddedness means that social relationships are a 
necessary condition for economic transactions (for a controversial discussion of the Polanyian 
concept of embeddedness, see Gemici, 2008). Polanyi describes the emergence of the self-
regulating market as the reversal of this relationship: in the process of commodification the 
‘substance of society itself’ was subordinated to the laws of the market (Polanyi, 1957: 71). 
Thereby traditional societies were transformed into market societies that faced the 
destabilizing effects of market forces. 
 Thus, according to Polanyi, with the emergence of the self-regulating market, modern 
society developed the capacity for self-protection aimed at countering the deterioration of 
social and environmental conditions that result from the dynamics of the self-regulating 
market. ‘While on the one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe and the amount 
of goods involved grew to unbelievable proportions, on the other hand a network of measures 
and policies was integrated into powerful institutions to check the action of the market relative 
to labor, land, and money’ (Polanyi, 1957: 76). In Western Europe, ‘[s]ocial history in the 
nineteenth century was thus a double movement’ (Polanyi, 1957: 76) shaped by the expansion 
of the capitalist system on the one hand and forces countering the negative effects of this 
system on the other hand. 
2.3 The Emergence and Decline of the Modern Welfare State 
To date the social policy of the modern welfare state, i.e. state interventions that aim at 
furthering the public good (Mäkinen & Kourula, 2012), is regarded as a major mechanism for 
responding to the dysfunctionalities of unregulated capitalism (Ebner, 2010) described in the 
previous section. It can be seen as aiming at reconciling the contradictions between market 
activities and societal requirements (Harvey, 2005) in cases where private and public good do 
not converge (Dubbink, 2004). In particular, as argued by Esping-Andersen (1990), social 
policy can be conceptualized as compensating for the inherently destructive nature of the 
process of commodification of labour, which is a decisive feature of capitalist market societies 
(Polanyi, 1957). 
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 The disastrous implications of the commodification of labour already became apparent 
during the early stages of the industrialization, starting in the second half of the 18th century in 
Great Britain and with some delay in the rest of Europe. Capitalism gained considerable 
momentum up until the 1920s when the negative aspects of this system became more and 
more evident. Soaring inflation and its devastating consequences, which posed a severe threat 
to societal stability, can be regarded as the triggers for the limiting of economic activity by 
governments. Certainly, the phenomenon of social protection can be traced back to ancient 
times when ‘the family, the church, or the lord decided a person’s capacity for survival’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 34). However, these ‘flying buttresses’ that prevented the collapse of 
early capitalism were broken by capitalism itself (Schumpeter, 1975), leaving a void that was 
progressively filled by the modern welfare state. According to Polanyi, fascism as well as 
communism were made possible by the devastating outcomes of capitalism and therefore can 
be interpreted as extreme responses to the unbuffered forces of the market. Before and after 
World War II, in different areas of the world, specific varieties of welfare states developed, 
often as responses to labour movements, ‘protecting worker’s income from market 
fluctuations … since [g]overnments had to ensure that working-class life escaped the 
insecurity of the 1920s and 1930s’ (Crouch, 2008: 478). As conceptualized by Ruggie (1982), 
despite differences in the ways they safeguarded domestic stability by buffering the 
destructive effects of liberalism, these systems jointly contributed to the international order of 
‘embedded liberalism’. However, whereas in continental Europe comparatively strong and 
comprehensive welfare states of the ‘corporatist’ and ‘social democratic’ type developed, in 
the Anglo-American areas of the world, the ‘liberal’ type of welfare state was far less 
comprehensive (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Characteristics of the relatively narrow focus of the 
Anglo-American type of welfare state are a very limited unemployment insurance and private 
responsibility for old-age insurance (Tone, 1997), which became increasingly tied to financial 
markets (Davis, 2009). 
 In the United States, the New Deal can be regarded as the start of a systematic welfare 
state, including industrial workers’ right to unionize, the regulation of hours of work and 
minimum wages (Tone, 1997). By 1950, there was a stable coalition of business and state 
where ‘business received a steady return on investment … and [l]abour gained legitimacy, 
recognition, institutional stability, and an increasing real wage’ (Blyth, 2002: 94). In Europe, 
based on early steps toward the welfare state, such as Bismarck’s social security legislation 
introduced in Germany in the 1880s, the post-World War II era saw the installation of  
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comprehensive mechanisms of social protection. These provided for old age insurance, sick 
pay, working time reduction and systems of co-determination. 
 Both in the United States and in Europe ‘[e]specially in the decades after World War 
II, capitalist interests accepted more and more constraints: nationalization, progressive 
taxation, the regulation of labour standards, the dynamic growth of the welfare state which 
excluded such major potential consumption areas as health, education and social insurance 
from the reach of profit-making’ (Crouch, 1999: 75). 
 Since the 1980s, however, this trend has reversed (Hart, 2008). Whereas some of the 
ideas that constitute neo-liberalism have existed for the last 200 years, since the 1970s they 
became increasingly central in public policy (Crouch, 2009). The already comparatively 
limited welfare state in the USA and Great Britain was curtailed. In the USA, due to the 
growing importance of monetarist ideas in fiscal policy, the principles of Keynesianism were 
abandoned in favour of strict policies to fight inflation without regard for the adverse effect on 
employment. Further, increasing deregulation of business in areas such as workplace safety 
and environmental protection, and the privatization of social security can be regarded as an 
increasing disembedding of liberalism (Blyth, 2002). With Reagan in the United States, 
‘welfare provisions had become residual, its unions marginalized, and its divisions between 
rich and poor had started to resemble those of Third World countries’ (Crouch, 2004: 11). 
Similarly, in Great Britain, since 1979, there has been a massive dismantling of the welfare 
state and a radical turn towards neo-liberalism (Harvey, 2005). 
 Also in continental Europe, albeit with some delay, a decline of the welfare state could 
be observed. This can be attributed to the growing indebtedness of governments and excessive 
regulation curtailing the capacity of the welfare state (Habermas, 1989) as well as to the rise in 
favour of market-based solutions, the concomitant reduction of welfare benefits, and the 
increasing privatization of public services (Crouch, 1999). However, as exemplified by the 
simultaneity of privatization of pensions and welfare provision and increasing inequality on 
the one hand and the enduring stability of welfare structures on the other hand in Sweden 
(Harvey, 2005), the reach of these changes does not come up to the changes in the Anglo-
American world (Blyth, 2002).  
 Despite the different trajectories described above, following Crouch (1999), the 
development of the welfare state can be regarded as following the shape of a (concave) 
parabola. This means that nowadays the institutions which were established to counter the 
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negative effects of the market economy are becoming more and more ineffective, amounting 
‘not just to another wave of economic liberalization, but to a perhaps permanent dismantling 
of collective capacity to resist liberalization or bind it into and reconcile it with a nonliberal 
institutional context’ (Streeck, 2001: 38). That is, despite the fact that the specific nature of 
this retreat is far from uniform throughout different countries (Blyth, 2002; Harvey, 2005, 
Swank, 2005), the retreat of the welfare state in every type of capitalist economy seems to be a 
universal phenomenon of epochal rather than merely of regional significance (Harvey, 2005).  
 An extension of the idea of the complementarity of the market forces and social 
protectionism has been suggested by Crouch (2009). He claims that since World War II two 
different policy regimes reconciled the uncertainties of the capitalist economy with 
democracy’s need for stability. The first policy regime corresponds to the welfare state. 
According to Crouch, it could maintain its functions by means of Keynesian demand-centred 
policy. Since the 1970s, this policy model declined for a variety of reasons. Inflationary 
tendencies and rising debts made state-based demand-centred public policy more and more 
unviable. Instead, the private sector itself stimulated demand through credit expansion. 
However, the recent financial crisis has put an end to this practice of maintaining social order 
by reconciling capitalism and democracy (Crouch, 2008). Crouch (2009) claims that CSR is a 
likely successor as a central mechanism for the attainment of public policy goals; however, not 
without pointing out the potential problems resulting from such a concentration of political 
power in the hands of corporations. Building on these ideas, I argue that – in the light of a 
diminishing comprehensiveness of welfare states in developed countries and of weak 
governments in many developing countries and the concomitant increase of the influence of 
business firms on the public good – the logic behind CSR essentially needs to reflect the 
growing responsibility of business firms to mitigate the negative effects of their economic 
activities. To emphasize the complexity of the forces that are at work in CSR, in the following, 
I will provide two different interpretations of the role of CSR for contributing to the public 
good and thus of the relationship of CSR and the welfare state.  
2.4 Two Readings of Corporate Social Responsibility 
One stream of recent research indicates that CSR can be regarded as a substitute for 
institutional voids (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). Furthermore, the concept of implicit vs. 
explicit CSR proposed by Matten and Moon (2008) points in a similar direction. Accordingly,  
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CSR in the United States is prevalent in an explicit form, characterized by ‘corporate policies 
that assume and articulate responsibility for some societal interests’ on a voluntary basis 
(Matten & Moon, 2008: 409). In contrast, the ‘implicit CSR’ prevalent in Europe refers to the 
role of corporations in the wider formal and informal institutional setting. Therefore one way 
to conceive of CSR is as a functional equivalent to the modern welfare state in that its purpose 
is to mitigate the negative effects of the commodification of labour according to a prosocial 
logic. From this perspective, in the light of the demise of the modern welfare state described 
above, business organizations may ‘be the entities of last resort for achieving social 
objectives’ (Margolis & Walsh, 2003: 296).  However, from a less affirmative perspective, 
CSR can be regarded as a means of business firms to curb regulation (Banerjee, 2007), 
legitimize economic liberalization (Banerjee, 2008; Kinderman, 2009), and expand capitalism 
into hitherto untapped societal sectors (Shamir, 2008), thus following an instrumental logic. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the forces behind CSR, in the following the 
development of CSR throughout the history of modern capitalism will be traced. The basis of 
the following considerations is the strong similarity between social activities of business in an 
early phase of capitalism and the more recent phenomenon of CSR (Hoffman, 2007; Jones, 
2007). From the late 1800s to the 1930s, a lack of governmental measures to buffer society 
against the negative effects of capitalism was accompanied by the social activities of business. 
With the emergence of the modern welfare state in the 1930s, many of these activities had 
become compulsory due to comprehensive welfare state policies. With the rise of neo-
liberalism as a dominant guiding idea in the public policy of many developed economies (see 
Blyth, 2002) since the 1980s, however, the comprehensiveness of welfare states has been 
diminishing. This development is accompanied by a reinvigoration of social activities of 
business. To grasp the ambiguous nature of CSR and to illustrate the increasing influence of 
business on the public good, I will give both a positive and a critical interpretation of the 
social activities of business. On this basis, it becomes possible, firstly, to recognize the 
distinctiveness of both instrumental and prosocial orientations of CSR. Secondly, it becomes 
evident how crucial the role of critique is for revealing the ambiguous role of business 
practices in the attainment of the public good as well as for providing ‘resources for informed 
protests and progressive challenges to the operation of corporations’ (Willmott, 2008: 929) in 
general and to CSR practices in particular. 
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2.4.1 The Affirmative View on CSR: A Positive Reading of the Social Engagement of 
Business 
Since the early times of capitalism, social activities of businesses were by no means 
uncommon. Basically, the corporation, as it was then, could be regarded as an institution 
substituting for the social functions of families (Gomez & Korine, 2008) as industrialization 
eroded traditional forms of familial support (Polanyi, 1957). The owners of firms assumed the 
role of a ‘patron’ (Jones, 2007), thereby perpetuating pre-capitalist patterns of dependence and 
support. On the one hand, these activities can be regarded as being aimed at creating and 
maintaining conditions necessary for sustained production. Examples include investments in 
physical (e.g. railroads, canals) as well as in social (e.g. schools, housing) infrastructure 
(Brandes, 1970; Pollard, 1965). On the other hand, however, as modern capitalism 
progressively destroyed the pre-capitalist framework of society (Schumpeter, 1975), many of 
these activities can be interpreted as measures aimed at compensating for the societal ruptures 
that their operations were causing. American welfare capitalism can be regarded as the 
prototype of business conducting the functions more recently attributed to the modern welfare 
state. Whereas such measures were initially motivated by owners or owning families, due to 
the separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932) the social engagement of 
corporations became motivated by the managers of firms. Paradigmatically, concepts such as 
lifelong employment and welfare capitalism are strongly connected with the phase of 
managerial capitalism (Davis, 2009). Examples of corporate social engagement range from 
raising wages (Tone, 1997) to the initial private funding of TIAA (which became the major 
faculty pension fund in the US) by Andrew Carnegie (Davis et al., 2006) to social and 
financial security provided by employers on a mainly voluntary basis. In parts of the literature, 
these activities are received in an unreservedly favourable manner. Accordingly, the blessings 
of early capitalism in general are emphasized (Hacker, 1954) and the beneficial aspects of 
social activities of business in particular are stressed (Nevins & Hill, 1957). 
 With the emergence of the modern welfare state, many corporate social activities 
became compulsory through legislation (Davis et al., 2006; Jones, 2007). For instance, in the 
1930s in the USA the New Deal narrowed the leeway for discretionary social activities of 
corporations (Tone, 1997). At the time, the government built ‘massive bureaucracies aimed at 
imposing solutions for social problems from above’ (Brandes, 1970: 147). Indeed, business 
continued to voluntarily engage in social activities, but predominantly in the form of  
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philanthropic donations based on managerial discretion and values (Buchholtz, Amason, & 
Rutherford, 1999). Further, employment stability continued to be part of the corporate culture 
in many large firms (see, e.g., Jacoby, 1997). 
 With the retreat of governments from functions that have originally been regarded as 
the task of the welfare state, business can be regarded as increasingly filling the institutional 
void (see, e.g., Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010). For instance, it has been observed that business 
firms increasingly assume tasks that were originally executed by the state and engage in global 
governance, rendering the business firm a political actor (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007). One prominent example for such initiatives is the United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC). The members of the UNGC commit themselves to observe a number of 
principles that cover the areas of human rights, labour, environment, and corruption (Arevalo 
et al., 2013; Bremer, 2008; Rasche & Kell, 2011). Despite their differences, initiatives such as 
the UNGC can, in general, be interpreted as efforts to limit the negative externalities of 
corporate activities, a task originally ascribed to governments (see, e.g., Jensen, 2001). 
Correspondingly, in the area of theories of CSR Scherer and Palazzo (2011) observe a shift 
from an instrumental CSR, aimed at the maximization of corporate profits, towards political 
CSR, aimed at filling regulatory gaps. 
 Once again, a differentiation between the developments in Great Britain and the United 
States on the one hand and continental Europe on the other hand is appropriate. Due to the 
poorer comprehensiveness of the welfare state in Great Britain and the United States, 
voluntary social contributions by business firms have become common in the form of fringe 
benefits such as pensions, vacation pay, life insurance, and health care (Tone, 1997) for quite 
some time. 
 In Europe too, CSR is becoming more and more widespread. As mentioned by Matten 
and Moon (2008), this spread of CSR practices can be partly attributed to the decreasing 
capacity of the welfare states to address issues formerly exclusively dealt with through 
governmental regulation. Moreover, from an affirmative perspective, the endeavours of the 
European Union to promote CSR (see e.g. European Comission, 2001) can be regarded as an 
attempt to harness the capacity of private actors to counter the negative effects of capitalism 
(Amstutz, 2009), constituting an effort to create a private-public hybrid mechanism aimed at 
advancing social and ecological objectives (Albareda et al., 2008). 
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 To sum up, despite national differences with regard to the extent and depth of CSR 
activities, it can be observed that firms increasingly take on tasks that are traditionally 
regarded as the domain of governments (Matten & Crane, 2005). Thus the distinction between 
a public sphere of state-led regulation and a private sphere of economic competition is 
becoming increasingly blurred. With the concentration of governments on the economic goal 
of growth and the concurrent decline of the modern welfare state, a profusion of interest in 
CSR can be observed (Roberts, 2003). This development can be interpreted as evidence that 
business in some cases assumes a role that has traditionally been assigned to state agencies 
and welfare policies. 
 Further, in the light of globalized economic activity, it is necessary to consider the fact 
that multinational corporations that predominantly have their origins in developed countries 
and emerging economies increasingly operate in countries with only rudimentary welfare 
systems and insufficient legal security. In these cases, they operate in situations similar to 
those in early phases of capitalism in developed countries, where there have been no 
mechanisms in place to protect society from the negative externalities of corporate activity. 
The fact that a major CSR focus is on the protection of human rights in countries with 
insufficient rule of law can be regarded as further evidence for CSR functioning as a substitute 
for social protection. 
 This brief account of social activities of business that are not directly related to the 
creation of economic value shows that the tackling of social issues by business firms and their 
response to market failures is by no means a new phenomenon. Whereas a strong welfare state 
in the second and third quarter of the 20th century made such activities temporarily 
compulsory, from an affirmative perspective early welfare capitalism as well as more recent 
approaches to CSR can be regarded as decisive contributions to the public good. From the 
perspective of the work of Polanyi, these developments can be interpreted in the following 
manner: The less comprehensive the provisions of the welfare state, the more ‘beneficial 
constraints’ (Streeck, 1997) on economic rationality aim at limiting the negative consequences 
of the commodification of labour and consequently also at safeguarding the viability of 
capitalism. 
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2.4.2 The Critical View on CSR: A Less Positive Reading of the Social Engagement of 
Business 
Besides the favourable view on the social engagement of business described in the foregoing 
section, another interpretation of these developments suggests a more questionable impact of 
business firms on the public good. Accordingly, welfare capitalism was mainly aimed at 
preventing labour unrest (Brandes, 1970) and unionization (Bernstein, 1960; Jacoby, 1998), 
influencing employees according to the moral visions of their employers (Barley & Kunda, 
1992), and consolidating the hegemony of business in society (Williams, 1961). Marens 
(2012) describes welfare capitalism as a means of, increasingly, powerful executives of 
autonomous large, vertically integrated corporations to ‘ameliorate the potentially negative 
impact of their own autonomy in the interest of social peace and economic efficiency’ 
(Marens, 2012: 61).  
 In a similar vein several authors picture contemporary CSR as one facet of the 
increasing societal dominance of neoliberal ideas. For instance, Kinderman (2009) as well as 
Shamir (2008) describe CSR as a means to curb governmental regulation, thus making CSR 
not a response to the retreat of the state, but rather one of its causes. O’Laughlin (2008) 
portrays CSR as an attempt to mask the inequalities produced by business. Kinderman (2012) 
suggests that CSR needs to be understood not so much as a countervailing force to neoliberal 
transformation of society, but rather as a product of this development. In his account CSR 
firstly serves as a remedy for certain social ruptures caused by neoliberalism. Secondly, he 
regards it as a means to legitimize the instrumental rationality of businessmen in the eyes of 
society and vis-à-vis themselves. What is central to these accounts of CSR is their critical 
emphasis of the voluntariness of CSR. As noted by Shamir (2008), this voluntariness can be 
regarded as one facet of a comprehensive process of ‘responsibilization’, that is, of an 
increasing transfer of responsibility from the state to the private sector. In this view, CSR can 
be conceived of as a product of the ‘neoliberal epistemology’ that dissolves the distinction 
between economy and society (Shamir, 2008). 
 As demonstrated by Boltanski & Chiapello (2006), capitalism tends to incorporate its 
critique to maintain its stability. Thus, welfare capitalism and CSR can be reconstructed as the 
adaptation of capitalism to critique or even as a subtle strategy aimed at infiltrating the critique 
of business practices. Accordingly, Shamir (2010) argues that CSR is an example for the 
ability of corporations to convert critique into commercial assets. From a Polanyian  
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perspective CSR can thus be interpreted as the expansion of market logic into nonmarket 
spheres. The ideas of Porter and Kramer, two of the most prominent advocates of an economic 
approach to CSR, are revealing in this respect. These authors argue that the ‘opportunity to 
create economic value through creating societal value will be one of the most powerful forces 
driving growth in the global economy’ (Porter & Kramer, 2011: 15). More specifically, they 
claim that their concept of shared value ‘resets the boundaries of capitalism’ and ‘opens up 
ways ... to expand markets’ (Porter & Kramer, 2011: 7). As shown by Madi and Gonçalves 
(2007), CSR can easily be used as a means that only purportedly contributes to the public 
good, and actually aims at advancing the commodification of social domains. From this 
perspective CSR can be interpreted as not so much aiming at a reembedding of economic 
activity in society but rather as a furthering of the commodification of all societal spheres. 
Though less explicit than the ideas of Porter and Kramer, the majority of current approaches to 
CSR follow an instrumental logic that regards contributions of business to the public good as a 
means for increasing profits (see critically Banerjee, 2007; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The 
filling of institutional voids with the exclusive aim of profit maximization (Khanna et al., 
2005; for a critical analysis of this development, see Brei & Böhm, 2011) – as in the case of 
strategic philanthropy (Campbell & Slack, 2007) – might be a short-sighted approach – a 
fortiori in developing countries with weak institutions (Banerjee, 2007). If CSR is mistaken 
for simply another way of strategically shaping society to advance the economic goals of 
business firms (Reich, 2007), the overall effect on the public good is expected to be rather 
unfavourable (Gond et al., 2009; Hertz, 2001a). 
 Summing up, social engagement of business firms is discussed in theory and practice 
from an affirmative as well as from a critical perspective. Barley and Kunda (1992) observed 
in their analysis of the alternating orientation of managerial discourse that the opposing 
societal orientations of ‘competition, individualism, and calculative self-interest’ (Barley and 
Kunda, 1992: 385) on the one hand, and a common identity that is bound by common values 
and traditions on the other hand, has not only been a central motivation for much sociological 
research, but is even a central motif of Western culture. Due to their inherent ontological 
incompatibility, a theoretical resolution of the conflict between both orientations is not 
feasible. If one acknowledges that the discourse on the social engagement of business firms 
revolves around the same paradigms, a theory of CSR that integrates instrumental and 
prosocial considerations seems to be out of reach (see, e.g., Donaldson, 2012) and the conflict  
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between both these orientations is likely to continue in the theory as well as in praxis. 
However, despite their contrary vantage points, both perspectives on CSR and its predecessors 
have one thing in common: They illustrate that the potential of business firms to exert 
influence on the public good beyond economic activity varies with the degree of the strength 
of the institutional frameworks that aim at fostering the public good. What is fundamentally 
different with these perspectives is the evaluation of this potential. Whereas an affirmative 
stance towards these developments accentuates the potential of CSR to further the public 
good, a critical stance regards this potential as deeply problematic due to the potential 
predominance of economic rationality in CSR. Taking into account the validity and relevance 
of both perspectives leads to the following question: What are the conditions for realizing the 
beneficial potential of CSR while avoiding its pitfalls. Therefore, in what follows, I will detail 
the crucial role of critique – both theoretical and practical – for identifying different 
motivations of CSR as well as for creating context conditions in which the problematic aspects 
of CSR can be limited and the beneficial potential of CSR can unfold. 
2.5 The Crucial Role of Critique for Making Sense of the Ambiguous 
Nature of CSR and for Conceiving and Creating Alternatives  
Refusing to acknowledge the decisive influence of business firms on society on the grounds of 
the critical considerations given above appears to be futile (Matten, 2008). With the decline of 
the modern welfare state and ‘privatized Keynesianism’, a new regime seems to be necessary 
to reconcile capitalism with social order. As stated by Crouch (2009), CSR is a likely 
candidate for this task. I argue that the majority of the present approaches to CSR that follow 
purely instrumental logics are unsuited for this task. If the ‘managerial objective is to improve 
the overall performance of business by effectively addressing nonmarket issues’ (Baron, 2000: 
4) instead of contributing to the public good and balancing economic liberalism and social 
protectionism, such approaches are likely to further the reach of market forces. As shown 
above, such a predominance has the potential to undermine societal stability and to eventually 
lead to the collapse of capitalism itself. Instead of such a purely instrumental approach, only a 
much ‘more complex network of obligations’ (Marens, 2012: 79) seems to be suited to attain a 
viable balance between economic and social interests. From the considerations above – on the 
ambiguous nature of CSR – it follows that one an important basis for such an endeavour is an 
understanding of the entanglement of instrumentalism and social protectionism in CSR. Such  
  
36 
  
 
an understanding, in turn, is the requirement for effective intervention, be it in and through 
academic discourse, or through political processes and activism. 
 In what follows, I sketch the crucial role of critique in general and of critical 
management studies in particular for disentangling the different (and often contradictory) 
orientations of CSR for conceiving theoretical and practical alternatives to the dominance of  
instrumental approaches to CSR, and for finally overcoming conventional sources of power 
(Levy & Kaplan, 2008). 
 Critique has served as an important corrective of capitalism throughout its history 
(Boltanski & Chiapello, 2006). On the one hand, capitalism to some extent evaded critique by 
means of decisive changes of practices on the surface while retaining its fundamental 
orientation. On the other hand, critique in many instances led to the modification of practices 
with the aim of accommodating concerns (see also Streeck, 1997). From this follows that 
critique indeed has the potential to influence the course of events and that a critique of CSR is 
necessary to leverage its beneficial potential. 
Following the call of Spicer, Alvesson, and Kärremann (2009) for critical management 
studies to ‘actively and pragmatically intervene in specific debates about management and 
encourage progressive forms of management’ (Spicer et al., 2009: 537), I sketch three aspects 
of a critique of CSR that takes into consideration the shift of power and responsibility 
between the welfare-state and business firms: pragmatism, normativity, and the emphasis on 
potentialities.  
At present, only the onset of the crucial non-economic role of private business firms 
can be discerned. However, a shift of power away from democratically controlled actors 
towards private enterprises is already evident (Crouch, 2004, 2011; Hertz, 2001b, Matten & 
Crane, 2005; Scherer et al., 2006). The most salient example of the shifting power relations 
between public and private actors is the area of global governance (Scherer et al., 2006, 
2009). Whereas many nation states remain strong with respect to military power (Harvey, 
2005) or with respect to financial interventions in the current economic crisis (Crouch, 2011), 
in the wake of globalization the power of single nation states to regulate transnational 
business activities is decreasing. Functional equivalents to such regulation on the global scale 
are developing, but they still lack the comprehensiveness and bindingness of state regulation, 
and most likely will never resemble state regulation. Instead, global governance schemes are  
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emerging in which business firms within the scope of their CSR policies, nation states, and 
civil society engage in regulation (Abbott & Snidal, 2009) and the provision of public goods 
(Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). This development indicates that reliance 
on national regulatory agencies and welfare-state policies to buffer the negative effects of 
economic activity is becoming increasingly futile. Acknowledging this fact, but 
simultaneously rejecting the assumption of CSR as a purely instrumental strategy that solely  
aims at the commodification of all societal spheres seems to be a pragmatic stance. Such a 
perspective might be a practicable point of departure for changing management by pointing to 
inconsistencies and ‘making incremental incisions into particular processes’ (Spicer et al., 
2009: 550). 
Clearly, interventions that aim at advancing the embedding features of CSR require a 
normative point of reference. However, as observed by Mäkinen & Kourula (2012), current 
theories of CSR that theorize the shifting division of labour between governments and 
corporations (see, e.g., Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011; Matten & Crane, 2005) lack a clear-
cut conceptualization of the division of social, political, and economic responsibilities in 
society and therefore also a clear normative point of reference. Thus, following the call of 
Spicer et al. (2009) for explicit normativity in critical management studies, I propose a 
Polanyian reading of the welfare state as a guiding principle for a constructive critique of 
CSR. This is in line with an interpretation of the Polanyian double movement as a corrective 
to market fundamentalism as realized in welfare states (see, e.g., Dale, 2010; Ebner, 2010; 
Esping-Andersen, 1996). Applying this perspective on CSR, in times of a weakening of 
welfare states and the concomitant drawback of a state-based limiting of market forces (for a 
critical evaluation of the conceptualization of the welfare state as an embedding mechanism, 
see, Lacher, 1999a, 1999b), fencing off the instrumental logic of economic liberalism 
alternatively needs to take place on the level of the single business firm. Consequently, CSR 
might be evaluated against its capacity to promote the ideals of the welfare state (see Midtun 
et al., 2012) and to counter the disembedding effects of economic liberalism. In this vein, 
‘[CSR] in its highest and best usage … offers a conceptual mechanism for corporate self-
control in conditions of institutional failure to control’ (Wood, 2008: 162). Yet, since broader 
social goals are often incompatible with the economic rationality of business firms (Banerjee, 
2007; Vogel, 2005; Whelan, 2012), a purely voluntary approach to CSR, endemic in current 
theory and praxis (Banerjee, 2008), is likely to result in an instrumental drift of CSR. This  
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illustrates the necessity to set up control mechanisms that reach beyond pure voluntarism. In  
this context, Polanyi’s normative emphasis on the centrality of democracy for 
decommodifying the factors of production (Dale, 2010) is instructive. As described by Ebner 
(2010), Polanyi’s political project may comprise state-based measures as well as the 
democratic co-determination of business firms and associative self-organization. In the light 
of the declining comprehensiveness of the modern welfare state and the increasing  
engagement of business in CSR, the latter two features might provide guidance for conceiving  
forms of CSR that are viable elements of a novel institutional order that transcends the  
traditional either/or of public vs. private and instrumental vs. prosocial. These considerations 
point to the necessity to create accountability and control mechanisms in cases where 
corporate activities influence the public good beyond their generic economic operations (see, 
e.g., Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), thus shifting the locus of authority 
(Levy & Kaplan, 2008) and therewith re-embedding economic activity in society through 
CSR. 
 Accordingly, the normative conceptualization of CSR as a countervailing force to 
liberalism is not only directly relevant for CSR, but also indirectly, as it might be applied to 
the wider institutional context in which CSR materializes (see, e.g., Midtun et al., 2012; 
Steurer, 2010 on the issue of governmental CSR policies). For instance, it becomes possible to 
examine current attempts of the European Union to integrate CSR in its policies, thus 
scrutinizing the ‘‘messy’ micro-processes’ (Vallentin & Murillo, 2012: 13) of CSR programs. 
In the case of the EU strategy for CSR 2011-2014 it becomes conspicuous that CSR-related 
policies of the European Union on the one hand lean towards disembedding 
conceptualizations of CSR by referring to the concept of ‘creating shared value’ coined by 
Porter and Kramer described above (European Commission, 2011). However, on the other 
hand, the explicit call for ‘specific clauses laying down the right of parties to the agreement to 
regulate, inter alia, in the areas of protection of national security, the environment, public 
health, workers' and consumers' rights’ (European Parliament, 2011) in future European 
international investment policy points to the acknowledgement of the need to limit 
disembedding tendencies of CSR policies. This example illustrates how the ideas of Polanyi 
might be utilized to thoroughly scrutinize CSR initiatives with regard to their capacity to 
contribute to the public good. 
Whereas these quite general considerations can serve as the basis for the critical 
reflection on the potentials and pitfalls of CSR, one prerequisite for the effectiveness of 
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critique is the engagement with potentialities rather than a mere condemnation of actualities. 
Rephrasing Spicer et al. (2009), this requires to ask about the CSR to come, rather than 
focusing on rejecting the CSR that we currently have. The criteria of pragmatism and 
normativity can thereby serve as guardrails for conceiving a mode of CSR that is both 
realizable and beneficial for society. More concrete, it is necessary to conceive feasible means 
‘to govern the institutional tension between dis-embedding commodification and embedding 
de-commodification as overlapping moments in the double movement of market-making and 
market-constraining initiatives’ (Ebner, 2010: 41) within CSR, both on the level of CSR 
activities and on the level of the wider institutional context. Concerning the former issue, 
ideas for novel and more inclusive forms of corporate governance (Pirson & Turnbull, 2011; 
Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2012) as well as further-reaching suggestions 
concerning the opening of corporations for democratic control (see, e.g., Parker, 2002) are 
crucial. By these means it becomes possible to consider multiple perspectives and demands in 
corporate decision processes and to make business firms accountable to society (Valor, 2005). 
With regard to the latter issue, suggestions to guide and even require CSR practices within the 
scope of public procurement (McCrudden, 2006) and to link CSR with WTO law (Aaronson, 
2007) might pave the way for CSR as a re-embedding corrective to economic activity. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The described conceptual framework aims at harnessing the concept of the Polanyian double 
movement both as an analytical tool and as a normative beacon. By this means, the analysis of 
CSR can take into account the ambiguous nature of this concept. Obviously, what is 
problematic with a Polanyian perspective on CSR is the fact that the sources of the double 
movement are somewhat underspecified. Whereas Polanyi describes the historical counter-
movement against economic liberalism as a cross-class reaction led by pre-capitalist elites, the 
sources of prosocial CSR are not easy to spot. However, despite the functionalist 
underpinnings of the way the double movement is conceptualized, the benefit of this 
perspective is that it allows for theorizing the counter-measures of society against the effects 
of an unregulated market (Munck, 2004). 
 As has been shown, a historical account of CSR reveals that modern business has 
always contributed to the public good beyond its generic economic activities (and apart from 
its negative impacts on society and environment). Such contributions to the public good by  
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business can be regarded as following an instrumental logic or as being exercised according to  
a prosocial logic. As a first contribution, I suggest that both these types of logics can be seen 
as the organizational equivalents of the societal principles of economic liberalism and social 
protectionism (and therefore as a scaled-down reflection of the Polanyian double movement). 
With the weakening of the welfare state in developed countries, with the growing power of 
multinational corporations, and with the expansion of their activities into areas with only 
rudimentary institutions, the contributions of business firms to the public good are gaining 
importance - for better or for worse. If the vital importance of an equilibrium of an 
instrumental and a prosocial orientation of the activities of business firms is disregarded at the 
expense of social responsibility, the socially harmful effects of commodification are likely to 
spread and the stability of social order is at stake. 
 Throughout the history of capitalism, critique served as an important corrective to the 
forces of the market. Therefore, as a second contribution, I emphasize the importance of 
critique as a precondition for identifying and disentangling the different orientations that are at 
play in CSR, both in theoretical and in practical respect. More specifically, I highlight the 
value of grasping CSR from a Polanyian perspective for scrutinizing social activities of 
business. In light of a likely increase of influence of business firms on public policy and a 
concomitant reduction of the comprehensiveness of the modern welfare states, the Polanyian 
conception of the welfare state – limiting the disembedding forces of the market on the basis 
of democratic participation – can serve as an important guiding principle for scrutinizing 
extant approaches to CSR as well as for conceiving viable forms of the CSR to come. 
 With these insights, the proposed approach opens the door for research on how the 
elemental conflict between economic and societal considerations, which Polanyi has shown to 
be inherent in capitalism, is processed on the level of activities of business firms in general 
and within CSR in particular. The first task of future research will be to carve out the time and 
place-specific forces determining the extent of the material and symbolic realization of 
instrumental and prosocial logic described above, and the interaction between actual 
organizational decision-making and (scientific as well as societal) discursive representation of 
these forces. Secondly, it is of the utmost importance to research the suitability of different 
mechanisms that aim at re-embedding economic activity into society (see Gonin, Palazzo, & 
Hoffrage, 2012) so that CSR is not exclusively exercised according to an instrumental logic 
but rather serves as a corrective to the socially harmful effects of the economic activities of 
business. Research on social movements and the role of civil society as well as the emerging 
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study of governmental CSR policies seem to be important steps in this direction. Thirdly, 
research in the areas of economics, law, and political science on the grave implications of the 
increasing blurring of the boundaries between private and public domains resulting from 
corporate engagement in the social sphere is necessary to understand the transformations 
which society and economy are currently undergoing. The perspective outlined in this paper 
aims to contribute to this endeavour by shedding light on the ambiguous nature of CSR, and 
by formulating basic requirements for a critique of CSR so that this approach adds to the 
public good instead of advancing the dominance of market forces and economic rationality. 
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Abstract  
This article addresses the democratic deficit that emerges when private corporations engage in 
public policy, either by providing citizenship rights and global public goods (corporate 
citizenship) or by influencing the political system and lobbying for their economic interests 
(strategic corporate political activities). This democratic deficit is significant, especially when 
multinational corporations operate in locations where national governance mechanisms are 
weak or even fail, where the rule of law is absent and there is a lack of democratic control. 
This deficit may lead to a decline in the social acceptance of the business firm and its 
corporate political activities and, thus, to a loss of corporate legitimacy. Under these 
conditions corporations may compensate for the emerging democratic deficit and reestablish 
their legitimacy by internalizing democratic mechanisms within their organizations, in 
particular in their corporate governance structures and procedures. The authors analyze the 
available corporate governance models with the help of a typology and discuss the possible 
contributions of a new form of democratic corporate governance. 
 
Keywords  
corporate citizenship, corporate democracy, corporate governance 
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3.1 Introduction 
Throughout the process of globalization, the governance mechanisms of the nation state have 
lost some of their regulatory powers. This loss is a result of the prevailing global business 
externalities and the significance of global public goods issues, such as environmental (e.g. 
global warming and deforestation) and social (e.g. corruption and labor standards) issues and 
the lack of national government control mechanisms (Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 2003; Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2008a). In addition, a significant part of the world’s production is located in 
countries where there is no rule of law and insufficient or no democratic control over public 
policy issues. This situation sharply contrasts with the state-centric world order resting upon 
state sovereignty “that has endured, with modifications from to time to time, until the present” 
(Falk, 2002: 312) since the peace settlement negotiated at the end of the Thirty Years War in 
Münster and Osnabrück (Westphalia, Germany) in 1648. Therefore, in the literature, this 
world order is characterized as ‘post-Westphalian’ (Cutler, 2001; Falk, 2002; Held et al., 
1999; Kobrin, 2001; Santoro, 2010). In the ‘post-Westphalian’ world, confronted with global 
economic exchange, governance gaps and weakly regulated businesses, business firms 
operate under conditions where human rights abuses, social misery, environmental disasters, 
and corruption prevail. Even though companies are not always the cause of these problems, 
they sometimes benefit from such conditions and the lack of democratic governance, and thus 
become complicit with human rights abuses and oppressive or corrupt political regimes. Shell, 
for example, recently settled the case of the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Nigerian activist from 
the Ogoni people. Saro-Wiwa was sentenced to death and Shell was accused of complicity as 
it could have intervened in the process through their engagement in the Niger-Delta region 
(Wheeler, Fabig, & Boele, 2002).  
Many multinational corporations (MNCs) have started to respond to these challenges 
and assume broader corporate responsibilities, thus engaging in corporate citizenship (Matten 
& Crane, 2005; Scherer et al., 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008b). These companies take part in 
the new emerging global governance structures where non-state actors such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society groups, international organizations, and 
private companies contribute to the regulation of global business and compensate for the 
insufficient supply of public goods. Together they address issues of public concern, provide 
global public goods, or fill gaps in regulation (Büthe, 2010; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Scherer 
& Smid, 2000; Scherer at al., 2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Matten and Crane (2005: 173)  
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suggest that companies even assume a state-like role when engaging in corporate citizenship, 
which is defined as “the role of the corporation in administering citizenship rights for 
individuals.” 
This role is not problematic as long as the corporate political activities are embedded 
in the institutional structure of the democratic rule of law state, so that corporate action 
complies with legal rules and moral customs and is sufficiently controlled by democratically 
elected authorities and procedures (see even Friedman, 1970). We understand democracy as 
“a self-organizing community of free and equal citizens” (Habermas, 1996: 7) aimed at the 
attainment of just outcomes of political processes (Habermas, 1998) and the coordination “of 
collective affairs through their common reason” (Cohen, 1999: 385). Following Habermas 
(2001a), the authors regard democracy as a precondition for the legitimacy of governments 
and the rule of law installed and sustained by these. As long as business firms conform with 
the legal rules created and enforced by legitimate governments, they derive their legitimacy 
from the democratic processes, which legitimate these legal rules; then and only then 
‘legitimization in the market sphere is ‘automatic’’ (Peter, 2004: 1). 
In the post-Westphalian world, however, many MNCs operate in locations where state 
institutions fail (Fukuyama, 2004) and where there are no proper legal frameworks or 
democratic institutions (Palan, 2003; Peerenboom, 2002; Sands, 2005). Even the regulatory 
power of democratic states seems to be bound as demonstrated by the growing prevalence of 
global public goods issues and the limited success of uni- or multilateral agreements, such as 
the regulation of capital markets in the wake of the financial crisis. Under these conditions 
corporate legitimacy is at stake. Business firms lose their social acceptance as they allocate or 
withdraw their resources to public issues at will, or lobby for their economic interests while 
benefiting from governance failures (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995). 
Many authors in international relations and political theory argue that there are new 
governance mechanisms emerging that follow a new model of governance worldwide. Global 
governance differs from the received national governance model in many respects and partly 
compensates for the governance gaps in the global economy (Habermas, 2001b; Haufler, 
2001; Held et al., 1999).  The characteristics of the new global governance include: 
participation of private actors such as NGOs and private companies in rule formulation and 
implementation, voluntary engagement in public policy issues, weak enforcement  
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mechanisms such as blaming and shaming, network-like structures, policy field specific 
institutions, indirect authorization, and lack of democratic accountability.  
Various authors have explored the new emerging global order and have analyzed the 
conditions under which the institutionalization of global governance structures may help fill 
the aforementioned legitimacy gaps (for an overview see, e.g., Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Wolf, 2005). The implications for the internal governance structures 
of business firms, however, have not yet been sufficiently discussed. Therefore, we will build 
upon that previous analyses and consider what can be done within the corporate governance 
structures of MNCs in order to address the lack of democratic control and the apparent 
legitimacy deficits of corporate involvement in global public policy. Therefore, our analysis 
does not focus on the macro level of the global economy and the relations between business 
and society (for such an analysis see Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer et al., 2006; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007, 2011) but instead emphasizes the meso level of the corporation and its internal 
organizational structures and procedures. There are different approaches to defining levels of 
analysis in organization theory (e.g. Hitt, Beasmith, Jackson, & Mathieu., 2007; Klein, 
Denserau, & Hall, 1994). We regard the demarcation of the subject of this article (i.e. 
corporate governance structures and processes) from the level of the individual actor on the 
one side and systemic societal processes on the other side as crucial for our considerations 
Hence, we refer to the distinction between micro (individual), meso (corporation), and macro 
(systems) described by Enderle (1996) as appropriate for studies in the field of business ethics 
and business and society.  This analysis follows a recent call by Brown, Vetterlein, and 
Roemer-Mahler (2010) to bridge the disciplinary and theoretical divide between international 
relations concerned with the political and social sphere on the one hand and management 
studies analyzing organizational structures on the other hand. 
The authors develop a typology of corporate governance approaches to show that, in 
the past, corporate governance models were formulated mainly to optimize further the 
corporation’s bottom line (Scherer & Schneider, 2012). As political actors in global 
governance structures, however, corporations also need to respond to societal expectations 
and have to address the legitimacy concerns that their involvement in public affairs may cause 
(Barley, 2007; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995). Therefore, we suggest that the 
debates on “Corporate Political Activity” (CPA; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004), 
“Corporate Citizenship” (CC; Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008b), and 
corporate governance (CG; Clark, 2004) should be linked in order to outline the kind of 
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democratic corporate governance structures which may help to compensate for the democratic 
deficit under which MNCs operate in many countries.  
The idea is that companies compensate for the democratic deficit of their political 
environment and the lack of legitimacy of their corporate engagement with public policy by 
internalizing democracy, i.e. by establishing democratic structures and processes in their 
internal corporate governance structures. In the first part we define our understanding of CPA 
and CC in the context of globalization and explain the critical role of corporate governance. In 
the second part we present a framework facilitating the analysis of corporate governance 
approaches. Based on this framework the authors review the existing corporate governance 
approaches. Thus we show that the focus of corporate involvement in public policy has 
broadened over time, driven by contextual changes in the business environment, leading to 
new challenges for the corporation. Furthermore, we provide reasons for the creation of a new 
democratic corporate governance model, which may help to address the present challenges. 
Moreover, we briefly sketch out an empirical case of a corporation’s governance structures, 
which display several attributes of democratic corporate governance. The article closes with a 
short conclusion and suggestions for future research. 
3.2 Corporate Political Activity (CPA) and Corporate Citizenship (CC) 
3.2.1 The Political Role of Corporate Citizens 
The authors regard CC as well as CPA as specific forms of nonmarket strategies. Nonmarket 
strategies describe the political behavior of business firms in their nonmarket environments 
defined as “the social, political, and legal arrangements that structure the interactions among 
companies and their public” (Baron, 1995: 73; on the concept of “nonmarket” see Baron & 
Diermeier, 2007; Boddewyn, 2003). Just like CPA, which aims ‘to shape government policy 
in ways favorable to the firm’ (Hillman et al., 2004: 837), CC also aims to influence the 
design and implementation of rules and public policy. However, unlike CPA, CC emphasizes 
the corporate concern for the public interest. CC specifically describes the political role of 
corporations in global governance with regard to the direct corporate contribution to the 
common good, for example, the corporate provision of global public goods (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007; Wolf, 2005) and of basic rights (Matten & Crane, 2005). This view builds on 
the observation that the regulatory power no longer lies solely with state actors (Habermas, 
2001a; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008a). Instead, in the global governance, private business firms 
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along with civil society groups, international organizations, and state agencies provide 
knowledge and resources to the resolution of public issues.  
CC therefore can be distinguished from CPA insofar as it excludes all activities that 
merely aim to improve the economic position of the corporation in a competitive market. The 
authors do not argue that it is impossible to create win-win situations in which self-interested 
CPA such as lobbying (Hillman et al., 2004) or the participation in policy networks (Dahan , 
Doh, & Guay, 2006) also creates rules that increase the provision and accessibility of public 
goods. Yet under CC the provision of basic rights and public goods is the primary driver for 
the corporate political engagement and not a coincidental outcome. Most research on CC 
focuses on the relation between business and society on a macro level of analysis (e.g. Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2007, 2008b). Up to this point, however, the implications of CC on a meso level, 
namely for the design of organizational structures and procedures, have rarely been explored. 
Existing studies are either limited to the analysis of individual cases (e.g. Baumann, 2009; 
Leisinger, 2003; Rieth, 2003) or they highlight specific corporate functions such as 
communication or human resources (HR) (e.g. Scherer & Baumann, 2007; Preuss, 
Haunschild, & Matten, 2009). In particular, the implications of CC on corporate governance 
structures have not yet been the subject of systematic theoretical and empirical research (for 
an exception see Thompson, 2008). However, we consider the rules that govern the top 
decision level of the corporation as critical for engaging in CC. At the governance level, 
senior management determines how deeply CC is integrated into the corporation and it has 
become common knowledge that the role of leadership is essential for driving the 
implementation of CC throughout the organization (Bowie, 2009; Trevino, Weaver, Gibson, 
& Toffler, 1999). From an organizational point of view, therefore, it is first and foremost the 
design of corporate governance structures and procedures that enables or impedes the 
implementation of CC. The organizational level is also critical for addressing the legitimacy 
concerns that evolve with the political role of corporations in global governance (Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2006).  
3.2.2 Addressing Legitimacy Issues of CPA and CC 
The issue of how corporations could reconcile public and private interests without 
compromising their legitimacy is yet to be resolved (Barley, 2007; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006, 
2008). Many corporations influence public policy or take over state-like functions and commit 
to the resolution of public issues. However, we argue that these companies decide on public  
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policy without democratic entitlement and control. Corporations and their managers lack the 
legitimacy of democratically elected state representatives (unless state actors pick up good 
practices of corporations, re-integrate them in democratic processes, and turn them into 
binding laws and regulations; see, for example, Habermas, 2006; Wolf, 2005). This lack of 
democratic legitimacy of the “state-like” role of corporations is problematic because it affects 
public interests. Hence this kind of corporate nonmarket behavior must not be confused with 
private behavior “that is appropriate in the market place” (Elster, 1986: 111) and that only 
affects the firm and its contracting partners. In political choice situations, however, companies 
decide on public issues and deliberately cause externalities, meaning they “affect other 
people” (Elster, 1986: 111) who have no contractual relationship with the company and enjoy 
(in the case of state failure) no protection by the state authorities. Some scholars have started 
to specifically address the legitimacy problem of the new political role of corporations. On a 
structural level, Driver and Thompson (2002), for example, outline how corporate governance 
structures could be extended by the creation of a “corporate senate,” which consists of 
stakeholders who are typically not represented at the corporate governance level. Stakeholders 
who are affected or concerned by corporate policies (NGOs, local population, etc.) could 
oversee and influence corporate decision-making (see also Thompson, 2008). 
On a procedural level, Palazzo and Scherer (2006) argue that the establishment of 
communicative processes between corporations and civil society is a suitable means to 
increase corporate legitimacy. Building on Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy 
(Habermas, 1996, 1998), they suggest implementing corporate dialogue processes with 
stakeholders to produce legitimate solutions. Engaging in dialogue represents one way of 
exploring different interests and expectations. It creates an opportunity to find common 
ground and collectively agree on sound solutions that are accepted by all participants and lead 
to social acceptance and legitimacy.  
Political science literature outlines two ways in which alternative legitimacy 
mechanisms for private actors could be designed. The “positivist” approach distinguishes 
between input, process, and output criteria of legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999). It transfers the 
legitimacy requirements of public actors to private actors and describes a set of operational 
criteria that must be fulfilled for private actors to be considered legitimate (e.g. Flohr, Rieth, 
Schwindenhammer, & Wolf, 2007; Wolf, 2005). In contrast, the “communicative” approach 
to legitimacy emphasizes dialogue as the main means of building legitimacy (Habermas, 
1996). This perspective is based on the notion that legitimacy is not an attribute of 
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individuals, actions, or institutions that can be objectively observed, but is instead a 
communicatively constructed concept that is ascribed to individuals, actions, or institutions in 
processes of social construction (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006).  
To achieve organizational legitimacy, corporations have to “pursue socially acceptable 
goals in a socially acceptable manner” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 177). Consequently, 
perceptions determine whether private actors are considered legitimate. In a global 
environment, it is, however, virtually impossible to achieve a broad consensus on morality 
(Habermas, 1998). Therefore, merely meeting a list of formal criteria may not be sufficient 
actually to generate societal acceptance and to legitimize public functions of private actors.  
Thus, the communicative approach is better suited for shaping perceptions and legitimizing 
the political activities of private actors in a global environment. 
The “communicative framework” proposed by Palazzo and Scherer (2006) aims at 
legitimizing the rule-making activities of private actors in global governance processes. Their 
concept builds upon Suchman’s typology of organizational legitimacy, which differentiates 
among pragmatic, cognitive, and moral legitimacy. Palazzo and Scherer (2006) argue that, 
given the conditions of globalization, neither pragmatic nor cognitive legitimacy is 
manageable. Pragmatic legitimacy results from the calculations of self-interested individuals 
who ascribe legitimacy as long as they benefit from the corporation’s activities. To ensure 
continuous approval, companies would need to produce the requested output and possibly 
manipulate the societal context (e.g. by way of strategic public relations) so that 
constituencies perceive that they benefit from the companies’ activities. Yet corporations 
might not always have sufficient power and resources to do so. Cognitive legitimacy operates 
mainly on a subconscious level, based on shared values, norms and beliefs. In light of the 
pluralization of modern societies, however, such a homogeneous background can no longer be 
assumed, as values and expectations in a global society will not automatically overlap 
(Habermas, 1998; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Therefore, Palazzo and Scherer (2006) conclude 
that moral legitimacy will become the main means of gaining organizational legitimacy for 
corporations. Thus, in this article, we find it more appropriate to define legitimacy according 
to Suchman (1995) and see it as the result of a social construction process. However, Palazzo 
and Scherer (2006) argue for more corporate dialogues in a general sense, without focusing on 
the organizational implications of these dialogues. We will build on these ideas and explore 
the contribution of various corporate governance models. 
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3.3 A Framework for the Analysis of Corporate Governance Models 
In the following section, the evolution of ideal types of corporate governance will be 
delineated. Seen from a broad perspective, corporate governance can be defined as being 
concerned with aligning ”(…) as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, of 
corporations, and of society” (Cadbury 2003: vii) and thus as securing societal acceptance of 
corporate conduct (Gomez & Korine, 2005, 2008). The current design of corporate 
governance structures, however, with its focus on the primacy of shareholders’ voices (see 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004) and the profit objective (Jensen, 2002) seems to represent an 
obstacle for managing the corporation in a way that is perceived as legitimate under the 
conditions of a post–Westphalian order (Judge et al., 2008). A critical review of present 
corporate governance structures is therefore the first step towards improving the chances that 
corporate political activities, including CC will be accepted (Scherer & Schneider, 2012). 
In the CG literature, currently four approaches are most influential: Principal Agent 
Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Ruback, 1983), Stakeholder Theory (Freeman, 
1984; Freeman & McVea, 2001), Stewardship Approach (Davis et al., 1997), and the Team-
based Approach (Blair, 1995). We regard these theories as resulting in four distinct corporate 
governance configurations or ideal type models of organizational governance (Doty & Glick, 
1994; Miller, 1981, 1987; Weber, 1922/1978). Our framework builds on the configurational 
approach in management theory (Miller, 1981, 1987; Scherer & Beyer, 1998). Conceived as a 
critique and advancement of contingency theory (Meyer et al., 1993; Miller & Friesen, 1984), 
the configurational approach regards organizational configurations as ‘…any 
multidimensional constellation of conceptually distinct characteristics that commonly occur 
together.’ (Meyer et al., 1993: 1175). The reliable occurrence of common states and processes 
of organizations and environmental characteristics is regarded as the result of two 
complementary forces. (1) One force is the internal cohesiveness of these organizational 
features (Miller & Friesen, 1984) resulting from their functional harmony (Miller, 1987). 
Without an internal fit of organizational structures and processes the organization is likely to 
disintegrate and fail. (2) The second force is the selection mechanism of the environment. 
Corporations operate in potentially hostile and competitive environments. They have to 
respond to the challenges of the environment in a successful manner otherwise their survival 
and continued existence is not possible. As a consequence not every organizational 
configuration with an internal fit can survive but only those that adapt to the environment.  
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Unlike contingency theory which advocates one best organizational form for each 
given environmental status, the configurational approach suggests that, depending on the 
degree of conflict or heterogeneity in environmental demands and the latitude of structural 
options, there is a possibility of functional equivalents (Gresov & Drazin, 1997; Merton, 
1967). Under conditions of high heterogeneity and high latitude there is more than one 
structural alternative available that makes it possible for the organization to survive. Instead 
of describing simple and deterministic cause-effect relationships, the configurational approach 
aims at a holistic explanation of organizations and their environments by emphasizing mutual 
influences, complementarity effects, and the capacity of various organizational configurations 
to secure organizational survival (equifinality) (Gresov & Drazin, 1997; Scherer & Beyer, 
1998).  
The approach outlined in this article builds on this understanding. Accordingly, the 
authors regard the empirical types of corporate governance as realizations of the elements of 
one or several ideal types in dependence on features of the organizational environment. By 
shedding light on the interplay between environmental factors and organizational structures, 
our perspective adds to a growing body of research aimed at understanding corporate 
governance from an institutional perspective (e.g. Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Davis & Useem, 
2002; Fiss, 2008; Jackson & Moerke, 2005). However, our reconstruction of ideal types of 
CG from a configurational perspective contrasts with most contemporary approaches in two 
ways. Firstly, we do not follow the mainly positivistic understanding of configurations as 
approximations to real types that are characterized by given structures and predefined cause-
and-effect-relationships, an understanding that is endemic in most publications (e.g. Aguilera 
& Jackson, 2010; Fiss, 2007). Rather, we regard configurations as ‘frameworks’, i.e. as ideal 
concept patterns which show possible relationships between individual elements of strategy, 
organizational parameters, and contextual factors without prescribing these in a set manner 
(Porter, 1991; Scherer & Dowling, 1995). The second aspect concerns the criteria used to 
evaluate the success of specific structures. In the majority of the work on organizational 
configurations (e.g. Doty & Glick, 1994; Payne, 2006) as well as in most research on CG 
(Zingales, 1998) the financial performance of the firm is taken as the sole evaluation criterion 
for the effectiveness of the analyzed structures. Applying the configurational approach to the 
study of CG, we build on a much more comprehensive and context-specific conception of 
effectiveness. From this perspective, ‘… effectiveness in the broadest sense involves the 
accountability of corporate decision-makers and the legitimacy of decisions about their  
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different economic and noneconomic goals and values’ (Aguilera et al., 2008: 476). Hence, 
we define the effectiveness of corporate governance not only in terms of maximization of 
economic efficiency, but we also take into account the capacity of CG structures to balance 
various environmental demands and to enable organizational survival by generating 
legitimacy. Building on this particular configurational view of corporate governance, we (re-) 
construct ideal types of CG which are stable due to their capacity to safeguard organizational 
efficiency and at the same time contribute to the legitimacy of a firm in specific historical 
contexts. However, it must be noted that in many cases the degree of conformance of an 
organization with an ideal type can only be assessed through in-depth studies. That is, in 
many cases merely symbolic conformance with an ideal type suffices to simulate 
conformance with environmental requirements, and therefore secure organizational survival. 
For instance, this simulation has been shown by Westphal and Zajac (1998) for the adoption 
of means aimed at the protection of shareholders or by Boiral (2007) for the case of the 
adoption of the ISO 14001 standard for environmental management. 
3.3.1 Three Dimensions to Compare Corporate Governance Models 
A recent study that assessed the organizational embeddedness of CC at MNCs (Baumann, 
2009; Baumann & Scherer, 2010) identified three organizational dimensions that need to be 
addressed simultaneously for realizing CC in a way that is perceived as legitimate. The (1) 
commitment dimension, (2) structural/procedural dimension, and (3) interactive dimension 
capture the strategic objectives of a corporation (commitment), their internal implementation 
(structural/procedural) and their ability to integrate stakeholder concerns (interactive). The 
implementation of one dimension is ineffective without the parallel implementation of the 
others, as only their interplay guarantees the appropriate definition, management and handling 
of CC issues. These dimensions correspond with the idea of an ideal-type configurational 
approach and the pressure towards internal coherence. While commitment, 
structural/procedural, and interactive dimensions emphasize the critical aspects for managing 
corporate legitimacy and prescribe certain characteristics, they do not necessarily determine 
the actual design of the configurations but leave latitude for the emergence of equifinal 
structures as solutions to environmental challenges (Gresov & Drazin, 1997). Hence, for the 
purpose of this article, they complement the configurational approach because they 
specifically highlight the aspects that are relevant for managing corporate legitimacy. 
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3.3.1.1 Commitment Dimension 
The commitment dimension describes the publicly expressed readiness of corporate leaders to 
integrate issues of public concern in the corporate decision-making process. It also captures 
the issue of the understanding of corporate leaders, particularly whether they define a societal 
issue narrowly as a strategic opportunity for the corporations, or broadly as an issue that, due 
to its complexities, requires a holistic solution.  
It has been shown empirically that the commitment of corporate leaders is a critical 
precondition for the implementation of CC. Embedding CC requires decisions from corporate 
leaders to align organizational structures and procedures. If the commitment to CC is 
consistently applied to all aspects of the organization, it should also affect the design of the 
corporate governance. A commitment can reach from acknowledging the need to weigh up 
public concerns against corporate objectives to making a concrete proposal about how to 
ensure the systematic integration of stakeholders that are typically not represented at the board 
level. To assess empirically the commitment dimension of corporate governance, public 
speeches of corporate leaders as well as corporate codes of conduct, corporate governance 
codes, and mission statements can be analyzed. The minutes of shareholder meetings, where 
board members must justify corporate decisions, are probably particularly good data sources 
for assessing the commitment level. In addition, the commitment dimension could be cross-
checked with third parties. Their assessment of the willingness of corporate leaders to 
integrate stakeholders in dialogue over critical corporate decisions could verify the corporate 
statements. 
3.3.1.2 Structural and Procedural Dimension 
The structural and procedural dimension captures the organizational prerequisites for 
integrating issues of public concern. This dimension includes structural aspects of the 
organization, such as the composition of the board (e.g. the role of inside or outside 
members), as well as procedural aspects, such as the decision-making procedures and the 
distribution of voting powers at the board level. If internal and external stakeholders that are 
typically not represented at the board level are made part of decision-making processes, their 
role could be consultative, participatory, or include voting power. These different types of 
roles must be outlined in formal procedures, and therefore documents that describe policies 
and procedures are informative sources for assessing the level of CC embeddedness on the 
structural and procedural dimension of corporate governance.  
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3.3.1.3 Interactive Dimension 
The interactive dimension includes indicators that assess the degree of interaction with and 
integration of internal and external stakeholders in the corporate decision-making process. In 
order to embed CC internally, representatives must be nominated from different departments 
and hierarchical levels. These representatives must be brought together regularly to ensure 
that information can travel bottom-up as well as trickle top-down from governance levels. 
Some companies have for this reason created specific board committees that pay attention to 
CC issues and oversee the implementation process. Integrating external stakeholders requires 
knowledge of the stakeholder landscape because, depending on the issue area, different 
stakeholders are relevant. Mapping the stakeholder landscape and developing stable 
relationships with stakeholders before crisis points, prepares for constructive interactions. For 
both the integration of internal and external stakeholders at the governance level the 
transparency over board documents is a key issue. Access to the board’s agenda, planned 
decision-points, and meeting minutes represents a main precondition for enabling a public 
debate over critical corporate decisions. Therefore, these documents should be made available 
to relevant stakeholders. The level of transparency can be assessed by reviewing the flow of 
information inside of the organization as well as by analyzing the communication between the 
corporation and relevant stakeholders. 
3.3.2 Implications for the Mode of Corporate Engagement in Public Policy 
The various corporate governance models differ in how they address the respective 
governance challenges and how they make use of the available corporate governance 
structures and processes. As a result they lead to different kinds of nonmarket strategies such 
as CPA or CC (mode of corporate engagement in public policy): personal relationships 
between business people and politics (e.g. A. Leland Stanford) in the Pre-Industrial CG 
Model; corporate lobbying for public and governmental support in the Industrial CG Model; 
corporate lobbying for investor’ support paired with investor influence on public policy in the 
Investor and Stakeholder CG Model; both corporate lobbying and reputation building in the 
Knowledge and Stewardship CG Model; corporate engagement in global governance and the 
production of public goods in the Democratic CG Model (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: The evolution of corporate governance models and the strengthening of democracy (Gomez & Korine, 
2005: 747, modified and extended; Scherer & Schneider, 2012: 83) 
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3.4 A Typology of Corporate Governance (CG) Models 
From an organizational theory point of view, the analytical construction of a typology was 
chosen over a taxonomy due to the methodological problems related to the empirical 
configuration research (Dess et al., 1993; Hambrick, 1984; Scherer & Beyer, 1998). In line 
with the considerations described above, ideal types are not to be regarded as testable 
hypotheses about specific relationships between organizations and their environment or about 
the resulting organizational features. Rather, ideal types condense decisive environmental 
features and appropriate organizational adaptations to these features in a highly stylized 
manner (see Doty & Glick, 1994; Miller, 1981, 1987; Weber, 1922/1978). Since a typology 
consists of conceptually derived interrelated sets of ideal types, creating an ideal type of 
democratic corporate governance will eventually help to measure whether corporations 
conform more or less to the phenomenon (Doty & Glick, 1994; Kolk & Mauser, 2001: 22). 
Thus, instead of statistically analyzing a large set of data in order to find common patterns, 
after the description of ideal types of CG this study will use only one case to highlight the 
commonalities with the theoretically constructed ideal.  
Accordingly, in the following material we conceptualize corporate governance as 
evolving in several steps, representing ideal types or configurations of corporate governance, 
which can be regarded as appropriate and consistent responses to the challenges of distinct 
stages in the development of modern capitalism, thereby securing economic performance as 
well as societal acceptance (Scherer & Schneider, 2012). In particular we show that in the 
course of this development process an adaptation of corporate governance to the blurring 
between the private and public sphere, which is characteristic of the post-Westphalian world, 
can be observed. This adaptation results in an increasing broadening of the interactive 
dimension of the ideal types of CG described in the following. 
3.4.1 Pre-Industrial CG 
Pre-industrial corporate governance can be characterized as an outcome of changing 
conditions of property in modernizing societies. The emergence of liberal societies based on 
the values of civic equality, the unlimited right to private property, freedom of contract, and a 
free-enterprise system made the invention of the corporation as an institution of private 
property possible. Whereas in liberal societies governmental institutions underwent a 
transformation towards political enfranchisement and democratization, private business firms  
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were at the turn of the century governed exclusively according to the terms of private contracts 
and the authority of business owners. However, despite the monopoly of power, the owner 
was dependent on obedience and acceptance of orders. Safeguarding this acceptance can be 
regarded as the focus of pre-industrial corporate governance. Acceptance in typically family-
owned firms was secured through the principles of durability, moral values, succession and 
independence (Gomez & Korine, 2008: 90). Consistent with the exclusive concentration of 
power in the hand of the owner was a potentially low commitment of firms to issues of public 
concern, depending exclusively on the benevolence of the owners of a firm. Therefore, in 
structural, procedural, and interactive respect no embeddedness of CC in corporate structures 
and processes was observable in Pre-Industrial CG. Due to the concentration of power in the 
hands of the owners of a business, no interaction took place either with regard to the 
representation of firm-external interests or public debate. Backed by their absolute position of 
power, owners and owning families engaged in political activities in various ways, such as the 
‘robber barons’ (e.g. John D. Rockefeller or Cornelius Vanderbilt), both by influencing or 
personally participating in politics (e.g. A. Leland Stanford) (Josephson, 1934). Such activities 
can be regarded as antecedents of modern organized CPA. 
3.4.2 Industrial CG 
Industrial corporate governance has its roots in the growth of modern corporations. Due to 
increasing market size, vertical integration of production, and technologies of mass-production 
firms grew larger and became more and more complex multiunit enterprises. To secure the 
efficient administration of organizational transactions within such enterprises, owners 
transferred power to professional managers (Chandler, 2004). At the same time, a growing 
demand for capital necessitated the raising of fresh capital by issuing new shares. With these 
developments a separation of ownership and control took place (Berle & Means, 1932), a 
structural feature typical for Industrial CG as well as for all following ideal types of CG. In 
this situation the divergence of interest between owners and managers necessitated the 
implementation of arrangements to protect shareholders from potential misconduct of 
managers. These developments resulted in the establishment of corporate governance 
mechanisms such as corporate boards and public meetings, which represented the first step 
towards the opening of corporations toward democratic processes (Gomez & Korine, 2005). 
Beyond the particular group of shareholders, however, other corporate stakeholders continued 
to be completely excluded from representation within corporate decision-making. With 
professional managers wielding the ultimate power in corporations, commitment to public 
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issues became increasingly dependent on the benevolence of these managers, who in that 
respect replaced the powerful owners. Parallel to the professionalization of corporate 
management the practice of influencing political decision-making became professionalized. In 
the times of Industrial CG the influence of corporations on political decision-making in favor 
of corporate objectives – corporate lobbying – grew into a huge industry. 
3.4.3 Investor and Stakeholder CG 
With the strengthening of mechanisms to protect shareholders with laws as well as with 
formal incentives and control mechanisms (Fama & Jensen, 1980) on the one hand and the 
immense growth of financial markets starting in the 1970s (Davis, 2009) on the other hand, 
corporate governance underwent a further transformation. The rising ideal type of investor- 
and stakeholder governance is shaped by two developments. The first development is the shift 
from an industrial and manufacturing based economy to a service-centered post-industrial 
economy, essentially shaped by finance, visible in increased shareholding, corporate pensions 
held in stock, and increasing securitization (Davis, 2009). In this “investor society” finance 
became the all-encompassing paradigm. The model of corporate governance geared to the 
investor society is principal-agent theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It explains how a public 
corporation can survive when faced with the potentially opportunistic behavior of managers, 
namely by implementation of adequate monitoring mechanisms (Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 
2003) aimed at achieving maximum efficiency. Further, CG was considered to align corporate 
governance as closely as possible with market processes (Manne, 1965), thereby maximizing 
efficiency and value of the firm.  
The second development shaping Investor- and Stakeholder CG is the increasing 
corporate sensitivity to societal processes. The concept of stakeholder management postulated 
the criticality of ‘myriad groups’ (Freeman & McVea, 2001). This illustrates that societal 
sensitivity to corporate conduct became increasingly recognized as an environmental selection 
criterion for business firms. Consequently, in Investor and Stakeholder CG enhancing the 
responsiveness to the claims of stakeholders was regarded as increasing the probability of 
survival of a firm. 
Despite fundamental differences, both approaches advocate the consideration of 
specific stakeholders in corporate decision-making for economic reasons and they only differ 
with regard to their scope. Whereas the shareholder view concentrates on shareholders as the 
constituency which is critical for organizational survival (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Sundaram 
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& Inkpen, 2004), stakeholder theory assumes that the consideration of a wider range of 
stakeholders enables the maximization of firm value and thus the long-term survival of a firm 
(Jensen, 2002; Jones, 1995; Post et al., 2002). Beyond such instrumental considerations 
commitment to issues of public concern remained low. However, in structural and procedural 
respect, concern with societal issues increasingly became part of corporate conduct, ranging 
from efforts to safeguard compliance with the legal minimum to the implementation of formal 
incentive and control mechanisms to guarantee ‘corporate social performance’ (Wood, 1991). 
Therefore firms increasingly developed capacities to conduct social activities and engaged in 
dialogues with powerful stakeholders. Whereas in managerial governance, power was 
exclusively held by the management, investor- and stakeholder governance was opening up to 
external influences in a twofold fashion. Firstly, corporate management became confronted 
with activist shareholders and increasingly organized fund trustees and advisors (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994). Secondly, increasing activism and power of a broader range of 
stakeholders (Spar & La Mure, 2003; Zadek, 2004) necessitated corporate management to 
engage in dialogue with powerful stakeholders and eventually react to societal demands. 
Thus, despite the lack of formal representation of non-owning stakeholders in corporate 
governance, this increase in interaction with these parties in various informal ways is one 
decisive feature of investor and stakeholder corporate governance. With respect to politics, 
firms expanded their lobbying, which gained importance to influence policy-making in favor 
of the interests of firms and investors (Hertz, 2001). Furthermore, the growing practice of 
investor relations was not only limited to the exchange of information but often rather became 
a tool to shape the political climate in favor of investor interest (Davis, 2009: 178-182). 
Corporate political activities in Investor- and Stewardship CG as well as in the previous ideal 
types of corporate governance have in common that they are destined to be exercised within 
the regulatory sphere of democratically legitimized governments. Despite the legitimacy of 
such activities being potentially questionable (Baysinger, 1984), they take place within a 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Wolf, 2008: 230) of functioning regulatory frameworks where the 
threat of governmental regulation is present, making them conceivably legitimate. 
3.4.4 Knowledge and Stewardship CG 
Whereas in industrial society, production was mostly capital-based, in the emerging 
knowledge society (Bell, 1974; Stehr, 1994), knowledge as a production factor and therefore 
knowledge-workers gained importance (Drucker, 1999). As a reaction to this development 
new conceptions of CG emerged. Defining corporations as teams to which different members 
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contribute specific investments in order to facilitate the collective production of value, team 
production theory regards the balancing of the interests of the different team members as the 
foremost objective of CG (Blair, 1995; Lan & Heracleous, 2010). Such an extension of focus 
is regarded as a suitable means to gain a competitive advantage, which is achieved by 
motivating workers to invest specific knowledge in the process of team production. The 
recommendation to include knowledge workers on the corporate board can be regarded as an 
extension of the level of interaction with stakeholders, even if in this case the emphasis lies on 
firm-internal stakeholders (Osterloh & Frey, 2006). Just as team-production theory is in part 
based on the critique of the assumptions of principal-agent theory (Blair, 2003), stewardship 
theory can be regarded as an attempt to overcome these rigid assumptions (Davis et al., 1997). 
Criticizing the negative behavioral assumptions of economic theory in general and of agency 
theory in particular, it advocates the restructuring of governance mechanisms according to the 
assumption of generally benevolent managerial behavior, intrinsic motivation and the need for 
self-fulfillment. Based on these insights, commitment to issues of public concern was 
increasingly seen not only as a way to contribute to the financial bottom line of a firm but also 
as a means to strengthen the motivation of knowledge workers and bridge the legitimacy gaps 
resulting from an exclusive concentration of corporate governance on the interests of 
shareholders. Therefore, in Knowledge- and Stewardship CG the commitment to issues of 
public concern is growing. For instance, codes of conduct are spreading as a means to ensure 
that corporate activities comply with legal requirements and also with moral demands beyond 
the law. Furthermore, corporate volunteering is increasingly seen as a way to enhance job-
related skills as well as organizational commitment and job satisfaction (Peterson, 2004) and 
corporate philanthropy is regarded as a strategic means to enhance corporate reputation. In 
structural and procedural respect this orientation of corporate governance is implemented in 
multiple ways. Strongly related to the increasing awareness of individual initiative and 
integrity are approaches emphasizing the importance of corporate commitment for issues of 
public concern not only on the level of organizational structures and processes, but also on the 
level of corporate culture and on the individual level (Paine, 1994). 
With respect to political activities, in Knowledge- and Stewardship CG besides 
conventional forms of CPA such as lobbying and campaign funding CC is increasingly 
regarded as a means for reputation building to attract employees (Turban & Greening, 1996) 
as well as a way to signal the high quality of experience goods (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). 
With this concern for generating reputation by informing customers, corporations engage in  
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the dissemination of knowledge. Since knowledge can be regarded as a global public good 
(Stiglitz, 1999), such behavior indicates a first move by corporations towards the provision of 
a multiplicity of public goods observable in the post-Westphalian world. In this situation, the 
provision of global public goods is increasingly exercised beyond the reach of democratically 
legitimized governments. This development can be seen as one origin of crises of corporate 
legitimacy necessitating the re-conceptualization and democratization of corporate 
governance. 
3.4.5 Democratic CG 
The democratization of corporate decision-making is by no means a novel idea (Dahl, 
1985; Engelen, 2002; Tead, 1945). Most of the previous approaches, however, 
concentrate on the participation of workers in organizational decision-making (e.g. 
Collins, 1997; de Jong & van Witteloostuijn, 2004; Wilkinson et al. 2010). Relating to 
these considerations, but also taking them a step further, the authors conceptualize 
Democratic CG as enabling firms to respond to the challenges of the post-Westphalian 
order. 
What is essentially different compared to earlier cases is the mode of corporate 
nonmarket activity: whereas it was long limited to influencing political decision-making 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Shaffer, 1995), lately private corporations assume tasks that were 
originally executed solely by governments (Barley, 2007; Matten & Crane, 2005). 
Without being democratically legitimized to do so, business firms are confronted with a 
legitimacy deficit (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006, 2008). Furthermore, in the post-Westphalian 
world firms are increasingly confronted with legitimacy gaps and democratic deficits 
resulting from operating in unregulated locations and public policy areas, diverse legal 
systems and heterogeneous cultural environments. 
In the following material we sketch democratic corporate governance as an ideal-
typical configuration of organizational features which are adequate responses to the 
challenges emerging from an increasingly political role of the firm in the post-
Westphalian world and the resulting legitimacy deficit. Under conditions of functioning 
regulatory frameworks business firms derived their legitimacy from conformance with 
legal rules which are legitimated through democratic processes (Peter, 2004). However, in 
the post-Westphalian world in many locations these conditions are not available. The 
integration of stakeholders in organizational decision-making seems to be an appropriate 
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means to restore the fit between societal expectations and corporate activities. Whereas 
stakeholder approaches are limited to stakeholder consultations, democratic corporate 
governance goes a decisive step further: it integrates stakeholders in processes of 
organizational decision-making. Thereby the democratic deficit resulting from corporate 
political activity and corporate citizenship (Parker, 2002) can be compensated for, and 
corporate legitimacy (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006) can be safeguarded by internalizing 
democracy within corporations. 
The first distinctive feature of democratic corporate governance is the focus on 
corporate engagement in global governance and the production of public goods, reflecting 
the new political role of the firm and a distinct approach to nonmarket activities. In 
response to the resulting legitimacy problems, corporate governance aims at the broad 
legitimization of corporate conduct through observing the demands of diverse 
stakeholders. Such commitment to CC is indicated by means of participation in CC 
initiatives such as the United Nations Global Compact (Williams, 2004). Furthermore, 
corporate legitimacy is supported through reporting of social and ecological information 
(Etzion & Ferraro, 2010) as well as by means of third party control and certification 
(Gilbert & Rasche, 2007). On the individual level commitment to CC is promoted by 
facilitating responsible leadership (Maak & Pless, 2006) which aims for peaceful and thus 
legitimate conflict resolution. 
In procedural respect, suggestions to transfer principles of deliberative democracy 
to organizations (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006, 2008) can be regarded as a first step towards 
the democratization of organizational decision-making in general and of corporate 
governance in particular with the aim to enhance the legitimacy of corporations without 
impairing the efficiency of market transactions (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011). 
Deliberative democracy is conceptualized as a set of procedural rules aiming at 
controlling administrative power through discursive processes with civil society 
(Habermas, 1996). Applied to organizations, potentially autocratic decision-making by 
one particular group (managers or shareholders) is replaced by broad democratic 
deliberation, avoiding unfair outcomes and safeguarding the legitimacy of corporate 
action by moral discourse (see Suchman, 1995; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Furthermore, 
this concept seems to be an adequate paradigm for democratic corporate governance. It 
helps understanding how corporate decisions can be legitimized through participation of 
all relevant stakeholders in the process of decision-making. Furthermore, the 
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democratization of corporate governance potentially increases the availability of 
information for decision-making as well as the information processing capacity within 
corporations (Deetz, 2007; Gomez & Korine, 2008). 
With respect to structure, CC can be embedded in various ways. On all 
organizational levels commitment to CC can be implemented by adequate incentive 
systems, formal and informal control mechanisms, and HR policies (Stansbury, 2008; 
Stansbury & Barry, 2007). On the level of corporate governance, one way to safeguard 
corporate legitimacy is broad involvement of stakeholders in corporate decision processes 
(Gomez & Korine, 2008), be it by the appointment of outside directors (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Mintzberg, 1984), the creation of an additional corporate board (Driver & 
Thompson, 2008), or the comprehensive redesign of corporate governance structures 
(Turnbull, 1994). Such interaction with diverse external stakeholders as well as corporate 
cooperation with state institutions, NGOs, and civil society groups constitutes the most 
important feature of democratic corporate governance. 
The described features can already be found in many contemporary organizations – 
implemented with different focuses and to varying degrees, depending on specific contextual 
requirements. In the described ideal type of democratic corporate governance these 
organizational features are presented in a condensed manner, helping researchers to better 
understand current trends in organizations as well as helping managers to identify novel 
challenges and to eventually find new types of solutions, customized to the specific contexts 
they are confronted with (see Spitzeck & Hansen, 2010).  
3.4.6 The Evolution of Corporate Governance at Lafarge: From Pre-Industrial 
Corporate Governance to Democratic Corporate Governance 
In the following material, the authors trace the development of corporate activities in general 
and of the governance structures in particular of the multinational corporation Lafarge, a 
corporation that has over the past century continuously re-designed its corporate governance. 
We briefly illustrate how this firm in different stages of its development partly corresponds to 
the ideal types described above. We then show in greater details how the current corporate 
governance structures show a close resemblance to the ideal configuration of democratic 
corporate governance as outlined in this article. The authors conclude that this 
democratization of corporate governance can be interpreted as a response to the challenges 
Lafarge is confronted with in the post-Westphalian order. 
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Founded in 1833, Lafarge soon evolved as a major producer of building materials. 
Managed by the founder, Joseph-August Pavin, and afterwards by his sons, the business was 
in the first decades exclusively owned and directed by the Pavin family. Due to the 
prestigious involvement of the firm in the construction of the Suez Canal, Lafarge’s business 
activities and its workforce was growing rapidly. To accommodate the needs of its employees, 
Lafarge engaged in the provision of facilities for its employees, ranging from housing to 
schooling and hospitals. In 1889, Lafarge’s outstanding social policy was awarded with the 
gold medal of the Universal Exhibition (Lafarge, 2011a). While these social activities can be 
regarded as philanthropy they were at this point in time also crucial for ensuring the 
productivity of the workforce. The social benefits for workers also served as a safeguard 
against labor unrest, a common problem at the time. In sum, Lafarge’s social engagement was 
quite typical for Preindustrial governance of business firms in the early days of modern 
capitalism. 
Due to the rapid growth in demand for building materials, Lafarge grew to become a 
major supplier of cement. Increased demand for capital resulted in 1919 in the transformation 
of the family business into a joint stock company (Barjot, 2005). The board of the company, 
however, preserved a family majority until 1961 (Barjot, 2009). The increasing complexity 
and internationalization of Lafarge’s operations, led eventually to the hiring of a non-family 
executive and the professionalization of management (Barjot, 2005) which resulted in a 
separation of ownership and control. These features point at a partial correspondence with the 
ideal type of Industrial CG.  
A significant indication for the rising importance of stakeholders marked the launch of 
the so-called “Principles of Action” in 1977. The document comprises a set of humanist 
values and commitments that all employees of Lafarge should endorse. Through this 
document, the company not only defines its corporate vision – to become market leader – but 
also publicly commits to serve all of its stakeholders, namely customers, shareholders and 
local communities (Lafarge, 2011a). This commitment to serve shareholders as well as 
stakeholders resembles the ideal type of Investor- and Stakeholder CG. The idea of the 
company’s societal responsibility was strongly expedited by Olivier Lecerf, the Chairman of 
the board during 1974-1989, which is evidence for the commitment dimension of the CG 
structure at that time. 
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Furthermore, Lafarge started realizing that serving societal needs was not only a cost 
factor but could also potentially help to advance corporate profits. The company, for example, 
explored ways to use industrial waste as alternative fuel in order to create the ‘business case 
for CSR’. However, despite of this increasing awareness for societal concerns, the governance 
structures of Lafarge remained centered on shareholders. In the 1980s, the composition of the 
governance structures did not include societal actors (the structural and procedural 
dimension). It also took over a decade until Lafarge committed to work jointly with other 
companies on societal issues. In 1995, Lafarge supported the creation of the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (Lafarge, 2011a), a first indication for the commitment 
dimension of their future governance model. 
With respect to CPA, the early engagement of a representative of Lafarge in the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists (Cowles, 1997), a think tank with strong influence on 
European policy (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2011), provides evidence for the increasing 
corporate influence on public policy.  
Thus, in accordance with the configurational approach explicated above, Lafarge 
simultaneously exhibits features of Preindustrial CG, Industrial CG, and Investor- and 
Stakeholder CG. The parallel existence of various governance models can partly be attributed 
to the company’s paternalistic tradition (Barjot, 2005) that forbids an exclusive focus on the 
demands of the financial markets and preserves an emphasis on social issues. Further, 
country-specific influences potentially have decisive influence on the prevalence of specific 
forms of corporate governance (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999; Jeffers, 2005; for the case of France, 
see Lubatkin et al., 2005). Today, Lafarge has indeed become the world leader in building 
materials and it presently operates in 78 countries, many of which have unstable or 
undemocratic political institutions. Business development is oriented towards fast-growing 
markets, notably in Asia and in the Middle East. Over 60% of its workforce is employed in 
emerging countries and in 2010, these countries accounted for 53% of Lafarge’s turnover. 
Lafarge is also one of the world‘s largest cement producers and the cement industry accounts 
for approximately 5% of the world’s CO2 emissions. Lafarge’s current business strategy 
revolves around two priorities. Firstly, the company plans to continue development on 
emerging markets, especially in cement. Secondly, it wants to accelerate innovation in 
sustainable construction and construction systems (Lafarge, 2011b). 
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Lafarge is thus a truly multinational company and due to its strategic focus on business 
in emerging markets, it is highly exposed to weak institutional policy settings. These 
circumstances force the company to position itself in challenging political environments. In 
early 2010, Lafarge therefore published its Lobbying Charter. It documents the company’s 
commitment to openness and transparency when it comes to activities in the public sphere. 
Lafarge lobbies governments for high environmental, social and technical standards and for 
strict enforcement of regulations. In 2010, Lafarge’s most important public positions were 
those covering climate change and resources and biodiversity (Lafarge, 2011a).  
Due to the environmental impact of the cement business, the company also needs to 
respond to the concerns of environmental groups. Lafarge has for the past ten years been 
firmly committed to a policy of reducing its environmental footprint (J.P Jeanrenaud, personal 
communication, October 25, 2010). For the time period between 1990 and 2010, the company 
publicly committed to reducing its global net CO2 emissions per ton of cement by 20%. At the 
end of 2009, Lafarge had already met its goal and reduced its emissions by 20.7% (Lafarge, 
2010a).  
To ensure that the company’s sustainability commitments are broadly embedded in the 
organization and routinely advanced through daily business practices, a management system 
was developed that defines clear key performance indicators as well as incentives for 
managers to meet these objectives:   
“Sustainable development objectives form part of each manager's personal objectives. 
The results achieved are evaluated during an annual interview. The manager's bonus is 
calculated in part on the basis of these sustainable development results” (Lafarge, 
2011c). 
Advancing sustainability at Lafarge is thus not only the task of a specialized 
department. All employees are expected to contribute.  
Lafarge's environmental commitments have been implemented within the context of 
on-going partnerships with WWF International (Seitanidi, 2007) and other societal 
organizations. In 2000, Lafarge became one of WWF's first Conservation Partners. Initially, 
the company’s ambitions for the partnership were rather small. Partnering with a global NGO 
was seen as a good communication tool (Vilaca, 2010). Over time, however, Lafarge realized 
that the partnership with the WWF could be precious in various ways. Particularly the WWF’s 
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environmental expertise provided guidance in the implementation process to reduce CO2 
emissions (J.P Jeanrenaud, personal communication, October 25, 2010). 
The positive development of the partnership with the WWF led to a second 
partnership that would support Lafarge’s engagement in HIV projects (Vilaca, 2010). The 
company regarded the epidemic that also affected its business units in Africa as a social 
problem and therefore did not want to partner with medical NGOs only. From 2001 CARE 
France and Habitat for Humanity both became collaborators in defining the company’s HIV 
strategy (Vilaca, 2009: 187). Both projects demonstrate the company’s involvement in a new 
form of nonmarket strategy that goes beyond self-interested corporate lobbying and 
emphasizes the corporate engagement in the resolution of global public goods problems. 
Based on the experience of these partnerships with global NGOs, and with the 
company’s first CSR report, Lafarge‘s internal steering committee for CSR issues decided to 
institutionalize its stakeholder relations and suggested the formation of a stakeholder panel. 
This decision initiated a significant change in the structural and interactive dimension of the 
company’s corporate governance (Lafarge, 2010b). What had started as a typical stakeholder 
dialogue between a multinational company and various civil society groups had now been 
transformed into a formal feature of Lafarge’s corporate governance structures 
(AccountAbility & Utopies, 2007). 
The panel consists of ten experts who Lafarge’s CEO calls his “critical friends“ (J.P 
Jeanrenaud, personal communication, October 25, 2010). All members either already had 
working relationships with specific business departments of Lafarge or were personally 
recommended by existing partners. Since its inception in 2003, the panel meets biannually 
with the Executive Committee and the CEO. Preparatory meetings with the WWF take place 
throughout the year. The objective of the biannual meetings is to critically review the 
company’s progress towards sustainability. The panel discusses emerging, current and 
ongoing “hot issues” in the context of sustainability and it provides advice on how to improve 
performance on sustainability issues (J.P Jeanrenaud, personal communication, October 25, 
2010). The panel also comments on the content and quality of the company’s Corporate 
Responsibility Report and it also enriched the text of the Lobbying Charter for responsible 
lobbying (Lafarge, 2011d).  
At the end of each stakeholder panel meeting, the group jointly agrees on an action 
plan that the company must implement. The panel, for example, contributed to drafting 
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Lafarge’s 2012 Sustainability Ambitions document, a roadmap with 16 operational objectives, 
ranging from security to industrial health, from persistent pollutants to biodiversity (Lafarge, 
2011e). The panel is thus not just an advisory body but is able to make policy 
recommendations that are morally binding for the company. Mr. Jeanrenaud from the WWF 
said that the company’s commitment to implementing recommendations was critical for the 
group’s willingness to engage in the panel and to continue participating in the panel work 
over the years. 
In 2006, Lafarge created a second panel to help the company to develop its 
biodiversity strategy. Jean-Paul Jeanrenaud reported that the existing panel could not provide 
the expertise that the company needed in this specialized area (J.P Jeanrenaud, personal 
communication, October 25, 2010). This expansion of the institutionalized stakeholder 
engagement at the board level shows that the original model of the stakeholder panel was 
fully appreciated by senior management because it had added value to Lafarge’s operations. 
Jean-Paul Jeanrenaud explained that the panel had often served as an early warning system for 
the company by highlighting issues that civil society organizations regarded as problematic. 
Being alert to problematic issues, the company could proactively respond to the concerns and 
address issues before they emerged (J.-P. Jeanrenaud, personal communication, October 25, 
2010).  
The Lafarge Sustainability Report 2009 contains unedited statements by each panel 
member. In these statements, the panel members openly comment on the company’s 
achievements and non-achievements and outline the directions for Lafarge’s future strategy 
towards sustainability. 
For example, panel member Dr. Frank Rose states: 
“Progress against existing commitments on Persistent Pollutants is on track and the 
renewed partnership agreement with WWF, which has a particular focus on this area, 
is welcomed and endorsed by the panel. The panel looks forward to further updates as 
this program is implemented and, as last year, emphasizes the importance of 
stakeholder engagement, particularly local communities at cement kiln sites.” 
The analysis of these comments provides evidence for the deliberative processes that 
take place at the meetings of the stakeholder panel.  
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This description of the development of Lafarge’s Stakeholder Panel shows that the 
company adjusted its organizational structures and procedures over time to include outside 
stakeholders in corporate decision making in order to meet the increasingly pressing and 
heterogeneous expectations of stakeholders. The introduction of the Panel created a new fit 
between the company’s environment and its organizational design and thus contributed to the 
legitimacy of the corporation by means of embedding democratic structures and procedures. 
The company also actively engages in global governance initiatives which engagement 
is evidence for their public commitment and part of the commitment dimension of their CG 
structure. The Lafarge Report 2009 was drafted according to the highest reporting standards 
of the Global Reporting Initiative (A+ rating) and the company has participated in the UN 
Global Compact since 2003. Lafarge is also strongly committed to the development of a 
sectoral approach for change in the field of climate change, particularly through the Cement 
Sustainability Initiative (CSI; http://www.wbcsdcement.org). Co-chaired by Lafarge’s CEO 
Bruno Lafont, the CSI, an organization of 23 cement producers which collectively account for 
about one third of the world’s cement production, work collectively towards greater 
sustainability of the industry. 
The Lafarge example shows the emergence of a new governance model that has many 
features of the ideal-type democratic corporate governance model conceptualized in this 
article. Real cases never perfectly reproduce ideal-types and Lafarge also exhibits facets of 
other ideal-types than democratic corporate governance. Further research is necessary to 
analyze in more detail how Lafarge evolved, which features of the described ideal types 
dominated in which era, and which organizational and environmental factors led to the 
prevalence or disappearance of specific governance features. Yet, the dynamic adaptation of 
Lafarge’s governance structures to new demands (e.g. from environmental NGOs) as well as 
the consistency between Lafarge’s public sustainability commitments and its internal policies 
(e.g. HR policies and incentive systems) highlight the configurational characteristics of a new 
governance model and illustrate that democratic corporate governance is a workable ideal. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This article closes a research gap by linking the theoretical debates of CC, CPA, and corporate 
governance. The proposed new perspective provides theoretical guidance for the analysis of 
the evolution of governance mechanisms and for the design of corporate governance 
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structures in a post-Westphalian world. Following a configurational approach, we 
conceptualize five ideal types of corporate governance. The respective combinations of a 
specific orientation of corporate governance and their organizational parameters represent 
adequate answers of corporations to specific historic context conditions in a stylized way. 
Before conceptualizing a novel ideal type of corporate governance (democratic corporate 
governance), we refer to four ideal types of corporate governance already available in the 
literature: pre-industrial governance as a response to an increasing democratic deficit within 
firms (from the 19th century to the 1920s); industrial corporate governance as a response to 
the rise of managerial capitalism and the resulting separation of ownership and control (1920s 
to the 1970s); investor- and stakeholder CG (from the 1970s) as a response to the increasing 
influence of financial markets and non-owning stakeholders; and knowledge- and stewardship 
CG (from the 1990s) as a response to the challenges resulting from new organizational forms 
and the increasing importance of knowledge as a production factor.  
Beyond these contextual conditions, in the 21st century new challenges for corporations 
are emerging. The regulatory power of nation states is diminishing, transnational equivalents 
for this power are not available, and the power of corporations is rising. Thus, CPA such as 
lobbying, and CC, exemplified by an increasing corporate engagement in the provision of 
public goods, result in a democratic deficit as long as they are not legitimized through 
operations within functioning regulatory frameworks. To date, these changes are reflected in 
corporate governance research only to a very limited extent. Therefore, the authors firstly 
distill a new ideal type of corporate governance (“Democratic Corporate Governance”), 
condensing organizational parameters, which enable organizations to tackle the democratic 
deficit, resulting from CC and CPA, by internalizing democratic procedures. Secondly, we 
develop an analytical tool to empirically study ‘instrumental view’ and ‘political view’ types 
of conceptions of corporate responsibility (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Comparing empirical 
cases using this tool makes it possible to study the effects of different corporate governance 
designs on the legitimacy of the corporate engagement with public policy. Using the Lafarge 
Corporation example, we show that elements of democratic corporate governance can be 
found in practice as appropriate responses to challenges not addressed by other types of 
corporate governance. However, more empirical as well as theoretical research is necessary to 
understand the specific modes of interaction between organizations and civil society, their 
effect on organizational legitimacy and efficiency, and the effective organizational 
implementation of commitment for issues of public concern. Furthermore, the analysis of the  
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relationship between Democratic Corporate Governance and the prevalent variety of Investor- 
and Stakeholder CG as well as the study of factors favoring the orientation of organizations 
towards specific ideal types of corporate governance are of utmost interest. This article is 
intended to be a first step towards a better understanding of phenomena only partially 
explainable by other approaches to corporate governance and eventually might contribute to 
the redesign of corporate governance structures adequate to the challenges of the post-
Westphalian order. 
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Abstract 
Under conditions of growing interconnectedness of the global economy more and more 
stakeholders are exposed to risks and costs resulting from business activities that are neither 
regulated nor compensated for by means of national governance. The changing distribution of 
risks poses a threat to the legitimacy of business firms that normally derive their legitimacy 
from operating in compliance with the rules of democratic nation states. However, during the 
process of globalization the regulatory power of nation states has been weakened and many 
production processes have been shifted to states with weak regulatory frameworks where 
businesses operate outside the reach of the democratic nation state. As a result, business firms 
have to address the various legitimacy challenges of their operations directly and cannot rely 
upon the legitimacy of their regulatory environment. These developments challenge the 
dominant approach to corporate governance that regards shareholders as the only stakeholder 
group in need of special protection due to risks not covered by contracts and legal regulations. 
On the basis of these considerations, we argue for a democratization of corporate governance 
structures in order to compensate for the governance deficits in their regulatory environment 
and to cope with the changing allocation of risks and costs. By way of democratic 
involvement of various stakeholders, business firms may be able to mitigate the redistribution 
of individual risk and to address the resulting legitimacy deficits even when operating under 
conditions of regulatory gaps and governance failure. 
 
Keywords 
corporate democracy, corporate governance, globalization, legitimacy, risk 
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4.1 Introduction 
With the power and latitude of firms in a globalized economy rapidly expanding, their actions 
affect an ever wider range of individuals, such as workers in complex global supply chains, 
persons affected by pollution or other kinds of negative externalities, although the firms in 
many cases are not legally accountable to these individuals. Consequently, more and more 
stakeholders of business firms are individually exposed to risks and costs resulting from the 
operations of business firms in cases where the regulatory power of national governments is 
incapable of mitigating or socializing these risks. That is, the harmful consequences of the 
activities of business firms are imposed on individuals without their consent and without 
protection through regulatory frameworks: ‘the burden of risk migrates from the jurisdiction 
of institutions to the individualized sphere of personal decision-making’ (Mythen, 2005: 130). 
This individualization of risks beyond the reach of regulatory protection is a major feature of 
contemporary society, which has been characterized as a risk society by Beck (Beck, 1992, 
1999). Business firms are an important source of risks in risk society (Matten, 2004; see also 
Gephard et al., 2009). Therefore, the individualization of risks is a threat to the legitimacy of a 
firm, i.e. its social acceptance (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995). Since legitimacy is 
a vital condition for an organization such cases potentially jeopardize the survival of the firm 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
 The dominant approach to corporate governance advocates the primacy of shareholders 
(Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 2003; Judge, 2009) due to the residual risk borne by shareholders 
(Easterbrook & Fischel, 1996; Williamson, 1985; see also, critically, Stout, 2002) and the 
efficiency allegedly accruing from the concentration of corporate governance on the 
generation of shareholder value (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001; Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & 
Inkpen, 2004; see also, critically, Elhauge, 2005). The first aim of this paper is to show that 
this approach to corporate governance – as well as many alternative approaches – neither 
adequately consider the risks accruing from changing economic and political conditions of 
business firms operating in a global environment nor the resulting legitimacy problems of 
business firms. The second aim is to develop an alternative conception of corporate 
governance that can better address the individualization of risk by means of a democratization 
of corporate governance. We extend current research on the inclusion of stakeholders in 
corporate governance (see e.g. Driver & Thompson, 2002; Gomez & Korine, 2005, 2008;  
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Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2012) in several respects: First, we identify an 
increasing exposure of individual stakeholders to the risks and costs that emanate from 
business activities and analyse the incompatibility of this development with shareholder-
centered approaches to corporate governance. Second, we elaborate a selection criterion for 
stakeholders who should be represented in corporate governance. Third, we conceptualize the 
required democratization – by law and soft law – of corporate governance as a means for 
governments and transnational organizations to indirectly tackle global governance gaps. 
 The paper is structured as follows: In the second section, two central justifications of the 
shareholder-centered conception of corporate governance will be delineated and their 
appropriateness vis-a-vis the shifting division of power between economic and political actors 
and the resulting individualization of risk will be explored. In addition, we will discuss 
alternative approaches to corporate governance regarding their potential to address these 
issues. In section three, we will argue that a shift in the scope of corporate governance is 
necessary to appropriately determine which stakeholders need to be included in corporate 
governance. In the fourth section, we suggest how democratic processes can be implemented 
in organizations to guarantee a fair allocation of risk and to legitimize corporate power. The 
approach of deliberative democracy to corporations will be discussed as a possible conceptual 
foundation of this endeavour. These ideas will be exemplified by referencing the empirical 
example of stakeholder panels. A conclusion and suggestions for further research complete 
this paper. 
4.2 Challenges for the Shareholder-Centered Approach to Corporate 
Governance 
In this section we show that the shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance is 
justified by the residual risk borne by shareholders as well as by the socially beneficial effects 
alledgedly accruing from the maximization of shareholder value. We suggest that both 
argumentations become questionable due to the changes resulting from globalization and the 
resulting reallocation of risk from the producers of risk and the societal level towards 
individuals. 
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4.2.1 Risk and Efficiency as the Foundations of Dominant Corporate Governance 
Theory and Practice 
The shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance can be traced back to problems 
arising from the changing relation between ownership and control of businesses, first 
described by Berle and Means (1932). According to their study, an increase in the number of 
shareholders of corporations diminished the capacity of individual shareholders to control 
corporations. Professional managers gained influence and the owners lost the capacity to 
monitor the behavior of the managers. Assuming utility-maximizing behavior of the 
managers, shareowners ran the risk of managers utilizing the money supplied to the company 
to maximize their own utility rather than maximizing corporate value and, thus, the value of 
shares. Consequently, a control mechanism, which prevented the managers from shirking and 
misusing their fiduciary function, became necessary (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). From this 
perspective, corporate governance can be described as a mechanism aimed at minimizing the 
risk borne by shareholders, who are regarded as the owners of a firm. 
 In the course of the advancement of the economic theory of the firm, the conception of 
corporations was further developed: initially seen as the sum of the invested capital owned by 
the investors, corporations were redefined as a nexus of contracts (Coase, 1937; Easterbrook 
& Fischel, 1996) – bringing into equilibrium the conflicting objectives of individuals (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Whereas most contractual partners such as employees, debtors, and 
suppliers have well defined claims on a firm and therefore bear no risk due to the 
enforceability of their contractual claims by legal sanctions, shareholders need to rely on the 
management to maximize their return by maximizing the firm value, since profit cannot be 
determined a priori. The relation of owners and managers of publicly traded corporations has 
been explained by the principal-agent theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), highlighting the 
situation of asymmetric information between shareowners (principals) and managers (agents) 
and determining the optimal incentives necessary to prevent managers from shirking and thus 
motivating them to maximize firm value and simultaneously the value of shares. The 
(residual) risk associated with the uncertainty concerning the extent of the residual claims is 
regarded as the justification for the shareholders to have the right to appropriate the difference 
between revenue and cost, namely the residual claims (profit) (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1996; 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004) and therefore an important justification for shareholder-centered 
approaches to corporate governance (Stout, 2002). 
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 A further justification of the shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance 
relates to the efficiency alleged to result from the maximization of share value. According to 
this view, corporate governance focussing on shareholder primacy is justified in the following 
way: shareholder value is regarded as a single indicator by which shareholders and the market 
for securities can assess managerial performance (Jensen, 2002). The assumption central to 
this justification of corporate governance is the view that market-based allocation is most 
efficient in serving the public interest if extra-economic interferences are minimized 
(Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). According to this position, the mechanism of corporate 
governance remedies the problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control in 
the most efficient manner by means of the market mechanism. The market for securities 
assesses corporate performance by means of the share price. Consequently, managers are 
induced to signal their performance by the maximization of the value of the shares of the 
corporation they work for. Further, the maximization of the value of a corporation’s shares 
maximizes the overall productivity and value of the firm (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
Maximal productivity of a firm, in turn, is seen as the optimal contribution to social welfare, 
assuming that the firm is a value generating entity and the output of efficient firms is higher 
than the input. Since each unit of surplus (profit) adds to social welfare, the latter is 
maximized by the maximization of profits (Jensen, 2002). That is, by means of market 
coordination private profit is aligned with the public interest as long as the maximization of 
shareholder value takes place within the borders of legal and moral obligations (Sundaram 
and Inkpen, 2004). Both the residual risk borne by shareholders and the maximization of 
social welfare through the maximization of shareholder value can be regarded as strong moral 
justifications for the primacy of shareholders in corporate governance, as the debate on the 
control of business firms throughout the 20th century illustrates (Berle, 1932; Friedman, 1970; 
Langtry, 1994). 
4.2.2 Globalization, Corporate Governance, and the Individualization of Risk 
The dominant shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance relies on the fact that 
business activities take place within the borders of legal and moral obligations. However, this 
assumption becomes questionable in light of the diminishing regulatory capacity of nation 
states and the concomitant increase of power of business firms. In the following, we analyse 
in detail how these changes, which we regard as important facets of globalization and risk 
society, challenge the justifications of shareholder-oriented corporate governance theory. 
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 Globalization can be understood as the process of expanding social relations across 
national borders due to declining costs of transportation, communication, and coordination 
(Beck, 2000). In the course of this process distances and borders are losing their significance 
and the scope of action of multinational corporations has expanded considerably (Chandler & 
Mazlish, 2005; Strange, 2000). Concurrently, despite the state’s monopoly of the use of force, 
the effectiveness of national politics can be doubted in cases where corporate power as well as 
externality and public goods problems transcend national borders and become global. The 
increasing influence and power of multinational enterprises on the one hand and the 
weakening of the power of states on the other hand result in regulation gaps (Beck, 2000; 
Chandler & Mazlish, 2005; Kobrin, 2001).  
 In the course of the shift of power between nation states and business firms corporations 
play an ambiguous role (Scherer et al., 2009). On the one hand, they contribute to the efficient 
solution of public goods problems and engage in activities that were traditionally seen as the 
domain of nation states. Private actors such as businesses, NGOs, and civil society groups are 
engaging in the definition and enforcement of global rules and the production of public goods 
and thereby contribute to a new form of global governance that partly compensates for the 
diminishing steering power of national governance. Ranging from the provision of 
infrastructure and education (Margolis & Walsh, 2003), the administration of rights (Matten 
& Crane, 2005a) to involvement in rulemaking on the global scale and to the generation of 
soft law (Abbott & Snidal, 2009), corporations take on a political role besides their generic 
economic role (Beck, 2008; Scherer et al., 2006). On the other hand, societal peace is 
threatened by the activities of private business firms. Examples are political lobbying 
benefitting corporations at the expense of the public interest (Barley, 2007), the complicity 
with human rights violations (Kinley & Nolan, 2008), and externalities such as environmental 
degradation (Osland, 2003). 
 The implications of globalization and the increasing political power of business have 
been reflected in the business literature (Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006) but have been 
considered in corporate governance research only to a limited extent (Scherer et al., 2012). 
While there is at least some work on the link between corporate governance and CSR 
(Bhimani & Soonawalla, 2005; Jamali, Safieddine, & Rabbath, 2008), the challenges of 
globalization for the dominant corporate governance model have barely been addressed (for 
an exception see Boatright, 2011): the growing incapacity of national governance to regulate 
global businesses (Beck, 2008), to comprehensively protect stakeholders, or to provide global 
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public goods on the one hand (Hertz, 2001) and the corporate engagement of business firms in 
public tasks originally assigned to the state on the other (Matten & Crane, 2005a). 
 The dominant shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance is justified by the 
residual risk borne by shareholders (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1996; see also, critically, Stout, 
2002) as well as by the alledgedly optimal effect of a shareholder-concentration of corporate 
governance on social welfare (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004; 
critically, see, Elhauge, 2005). However, the diminishing steering capacity of states and the 
changing division of labor between the economic and the political system challenge these 
justifications. In the following, we show that the weak enforcement of contracts in many 
countries, the increasing significance of negative externalities such as global warming, and 
the involvement of business in the provision of public goods render the dominant conception 
of corporate governance questionable. 
4.2.2.1 Weak Enforcement of Contracts 
One reason for centrality of shareholders in the dominant approach to corporate governance is 
the assumption of the comprehensive protection of a firm’s stakeholders (except shareowners) 
through contracts and the legal system (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Accordingly, the 
important role the ‘legal system and the law play in social organizations, especially, the 
organization of economic activity’ and the availability of ‘police powers of the state (…) used 
to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-
performance’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976: 14) are emphasized. 
 However, with corporations operating beyond the reach of legal enforcement 
mechanisms, be it in weak states or in undemocratic ones, the option of the legal protection of 
stakeholders becomes curtailed. In countries where state agencies are either unable or 
unwilling to protect the legitimate claims of stakeholders the claimants are often exposed to 
the arbitrariness of powerful corporate actors. The power of stakeholders is further weakend 
when they have no choice other than to accept the terms determined by the corporate actors.  
For example, the common infringement of labor rights in global supply chains of major 
electronics brands (see, e.g., China Labor Watch, 2011) illustrates that even if appropriate 
labor rights exist, enforcement is weak in many countries. Still more unambiguous is the case 
of forced labor that accounts for up to 21 million workers of the global workforce 
(International Labour Organization, 2012; see also Crane, 2013). These examples illustrate 
that, even if there is some progress in the field of business and human rights law (see, e.g., 
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Clapham, 2006; McBarnet, 2007), the assumption of the enforceability of contracts through 
the legal systems does not apply to the lifeworld of many workers in developing countries. 
More generally, they illustrate that many stakeholders lack any protection through functioning 
legal systems and therefore are directly exposed to risk resulting from the activities of 
business firms. Even if most multinational corporations are based in countries where the 
enforcement of contracts is strong, in the wake of globalization these firms potentially have 
some ties with countries where this assumption does not hold. Hence, the problem of weak 
enforcement of contracts between business firms and their stakeholders is of global 
significance. 
4.2.2.2 Negative Externalities  
A further aspect of the limited capacity of many states to enforce laws relates to externalities 
such as environmental pollution (Beck, 1992). Within the constellation of national economies 
negative externalities could to some extent be limited or compensated for by public policy and 
by means of law. However, this option is often unavailable where no or only weak 
enforcement mechanisms exist (see above). Banning or preventing negative externalities by 
means of taxation (Pigou, 1932) as well as proposals for the internalization of externalities by 
the allocation of property rights (Coase, 1960) are only partially viable, since contractual 
obligations between stakeholders and firms cannot always be enforced. Due to the 
transnationality of many problems of externalities caused by corporations, as in the case of 
climate change and toxic emissions, and due to undeveloped cross-border regulation (Bradley 
et al., 1999) specific groups of stakeholders or even all of humanity are increasingly exposed 
to risks resulting from externalities generated by corporations, without the immediate chance 
of legal protection or compensation (Rockström et al., 2009). 
4.2.2.3 Public Goods 
Strongly interrelated with the described developments is the expanding power of business in 
general and of multinational enterprises in particular. Firms provide public goods such as 
education and infrastructure; they engage in the administration of rights (Matten & Crane, 
2005a); they provide public security services (Elms & Phillips, 2009); and they participate in 
global governance through the formulation of international standards (Scherer et al., 2006), 
e.g. in areas such as labor rights and environmental protection (Haufler, 2001). These 
examples demonstrating the engagement of corporations in the provision of public goods 
indicate that corporations exert significant power (Coglianese, 2007), which in many cases 
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equals or even exceeds the power of state actors (Beck, 2008). Whereas in democratic 
constitutional states power exercised by the state can be controlled by democratic processes, 
on the global level corporate power is often uncontrolled. In such situations individuals 
become exposed to corporate power without sufficient democratic authorization and control 
of corporate activities and run the risk of unjust treatment. 
4.2.2.4 The Individualization of Risk  
In states subject to democratic rule of law public authorities rely on their monopoly in the 
legitimate use of force. All stakeholders of a firm – except for the shareholders – are assumed 
to be parties in explicit contracts that are enforceable by means of legal sanctions or to be 
protected by law and regulations (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). The state authorities secure 
compliance with regulations and contractual arrangements and either allocate the costs of 
negative externalities to their producers or to the society as a whole. As the sole providers of 
public goods, public authorities are controlled democratically and thereby misuse of power is 
largely prevented. Furthermore, due to its democratic entitlement and control, this exercise of 
power by state authorities is regarded as legitimate. The democratic state system acts as a 
mechanism for both minimizing and mitigating risk by limiting and socializing potential costs 
for the single citizen and for generating legitimacy for the use of power. Under conditions of 
globalization, due to insufficient state regulation and weak enforcement, many risks resulting 
from corporate action can no longer be mitigated by national governance and therefore are 
becoming more of a threat to individuals who are increasingly directly exposed to the harmful 
consequences of corporate activity. Besides shareholders, other stakeholders need to be 
regarded as bearing residual risks (see, e.g., Blair, 2003; Boatright, 2011). In other words: the 
risk becomes individualized (Beck, 1992). The individualization of risk resulting from 
business activities can be regarded as a notable facet of a broader societal dynamic 
characterized by an increasing significance of man-made risks that can only insufficiently be 
tackled by regulatory frameworks. To capture these developments, Beck coined the term risk 
society (Beck, 1992). 
 The re-allocation of risk from the risk-producers and the societal level to the individual 
undermines the assumption of shareholders as the sole bearers of the residual risk. Further, the 
contribution of shareholder-centered corporate governance to social welfare needs to be 
reconsidered. Jensen (2002: 246) explicitly relies on ‘… the government in its rule-setting 
function …’ to create the conditions necessary to resolve externality problems and admits that  
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maximization of shareholder value does not maximize social welfare when externalities exist. 
The incapacity of many governments to enforce contracts between stakeholders and firms, to 
limit or socialize negative externalities, as well as the increasing power of business firms to 
unilaterally decide on matters of the public good can be regarded as evidence for the 
incongruence between firm-level efficiency and social welfare (see also McSweeny, 2008). 
By challenging two important justifications of shareholder-centered corporate governance we 
expand the major current moral criticism of shareholder-centered corporate governance that 
relates to the concentration of control in the hands of shareholders (Boatright, 2004). 
4.2.3 Legitimacy Problems of Corporate Governance 
In this section we argue that the changed allocation of risk as well as the weakening link 
between firm-level efficiency and social welfare pose a severe threat to the legitimacy of 
firms and identify these developments as a challenge for the shareholder-centered approach to 
corporate governance. Legitimacy, as defined by Suchman (1995: 574), ‘is a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’. 
Organizational legitimacy can be based on three sources (Suchman, 1995): (1) the perceptions 
of beneficial outcomes from the organization and its behavior (pragmatic legitimacy); (2) the 
organization’s compliance with unconscious, taken-for-granted societal expectations 
(cognitive legitimacy); or (3) a moral judgment that is based on an argumentative process 
(moral legitimacy) in which it is judged discursively whether an activity is ‘the right thing to 
do’. 
 Under conditions of a functioning regulatory framework the legitimization of business 
firms in the market sphere is regarded to be ‘automatic’ (Peter, 2004: 1) due to their 
contribution to social welfare (pragmatic legitimacy) and their compliance of business with 
official rules (cognitive legitimacy). However, as soon as the risks produced by a business 
firm are no longer limited or mitigated by regulatory frameworks, individuals exposed to 
these risks might suffer a loss in individual welfare. Further, such cases are often uncovered 
by NGOs, civil society groups or activists (Spar & La Mure, 2003; den Hond & de Bakker, 
2007). Subsequently, information about corporate wrongdoing and critique can spread 
through media and the new communication technology instantaneously, and corporate  
legitimacy can be questioned globally, since a reduction of individual welfare of specific 
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stakeholders of the firm might be regarded as a threat to social welfare by a concerned global 
public. Both developments can lead to the questioning of the legitimacy of this firm. That is, 
pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy are becoming less reliable sources of corporate 
legitimacy. For this reason moral legitimacy is becoming more relevant (Palazzo & Scherer, 
2006). 
 Several authors emphasize the importance of corporate governance for the generation of 
organizational legitimacy. Taking a narrow view, corporate governance can be regarded as 
one mechanism legitimizing a corporation through the appointment of a corporate board 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Taking a broader view, corporate governance can be conceived of 
as a set of rules aimed at reducing business risks and thus as a guarantee mechanism (Gomez 
& Korine, 2008). By means of proper corporate governance, a corporation signals to potential 
shareholders that it practices sound risk-control. Thus corporate governance enhances the trust 
of the shareholders in the corporation and minimizes potential transaction costs resulting from 
the collection of information about risks for investments. Building on this definition, we 
regard corporate governance as a mechanism that signals the ability of a corporation to 
control and limit risks for stakeholders and thus contributes to organizational legitimacy. 
 The dominant shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance, which is adapted 
to the conditions of the pre-globalization era, neither takes into account the individualization 
of risk nor the incongruence between shareholder value and social welfare. Therefore, this 
approach to corporate governance is no longer justified by the moral considerations outlined 
above and is becoming less effective in contributing to organizational legitimacy. Rather, due 
to its disregard of the negative effects of business activities (Tirole, 1999), it potentially 
undermines corporate legitimacy. Therefore, the question is whether alternative approaches to 
corporate governance are available which have the potential to consider the risks borne by 
stakeholders of a business firm and thus to secure organizational legitimacy. 
4.2.4 In Search of New Principles: Alternative Perspectives 
Contesting conceptions of the purpose and objectives of a corporation and of the appropriate 
focus of corporate governance have been discussed for decades (Berle, 1932; Clark, 1916; 
Dodd, 1932; Friedman, 1970). With the aim of finding corporate governance mechanisms to 
cope with the challenges of risk society, in the following we discuss the most influential 
alternative approaches to corporate governance (see also Gomez & Korine, 2005, 2008; 
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Scherer et al., 2012) with regard to their capacity to take into account the shift of risk towards 
stakeholders.  
 One attempt to modify corporate governance is team production theory (Blair, 1995). 
As described above, the dominant approach to corporate governance has been conceptualized 
to overcome the principal-agent problem that is seen as threatening the efficiency of a 
corporation defined as a nexus of contracts. The core argument of team production theory is 
based on the increasing importance of implicit contracts and the resulting shift of risk towards 
stakeholders, particularly the employees. They become risk-bearers by (in part irrevocably) 
investing firm-specific skills in a team production effort – the firm –, thereby contributing to 
value creation, without proper protection through explicit contracts. Consequently, team 
production theory aims at motivating team members to actually contribute to the process of 
value creation as well as increasing the amount of information available for decision-making 
at the board level through participation of employees or knowledge workers (Osterloh & Frey, 
2006). 
 However, regarding the increasing importance of negative externalities, team 
production theory is constrained by the definition of organizations as teams and the resulting 
focus on team members. From this it follows that external stakeholders such as individuals 
and groups affected by corporate action who do not make some kind of investment with 
which they voluntarily enter into a bilateral relationship with a firm cannot be regarded as 
team members. According to team production theory, risk imposed on these stakeholders by a 
corporation cannot be considered within corporate governance. 
 In line with the theory of team production, stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991) is based mainly on a critique of the 
dysfunctionalities of principal-agent theory, the framework that constitutes the shareholder 
primacy view. Instead of regarding managers as opportunists, stewardship theory assumes that 
the objectives of managers and shareholders correspond in general. Accordingly, stewardship 
theory postulates that governance structures that do not constrain the activities of managers 
motivate managers to maximize shareholder value. One advantage of stewardship-theory lies 
in its emphasis on integrity of managerial decision-making. However, stewardship theory 
seems to be unsuited to respond to the challenges corporations are confronted with in the risk 
society. Being centered on shareholders as the central group of corporate governance, the 
reallocation of risk from the risk-producers and the societal level to individuals will only be 
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taken into account if this issue is taken into consideration by corporate managers. However, a 
conflict between the interests of corporate shareholders and stakeholders occurs (Friedman, 
1970) as soon as the consideration of risks for stakeholders conflicts with the financial 
interests of the shareholders.  
 The concept of stakeholder democracy (Matten & Crane, 2005b), which can be 
regarded as an extension of stakeholder theories (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2010), 
emphasizes the importance of democratic participation in corporate decision-making. 
According to Gomez and Korine (2005, 2008), corporate governance can be regarded as a 
mechanism to secure the consent of the individuals governed by corporate actions, e.g. all 
stakeholders. The authors suggest that the democratization of corporate governance is a means 
to achieve the consent of the stakeholders of a firm. Therefore, stakeholder democracy has the 
potential to take into account the interests of all stakeholders affected by the reallocation of 
risks and to thus maintain or restore the legitimacy of business firms. 
 Summing up, dominant corporate governance theory, team production theory, and 
stewardship theory all have a limited focus on specific stakeholder groups and therefore lack 
the capacity to appropriately take into account the reallocation of risks. In contrast, 
suggestions to integrate stakeholders into organizational decisionmaking directly aim at 
internalizing democratic processes within the boundaries of the corporation. Such openness to 
discourse and external control potentially allows to extend the focus of corporate governance 
beyond those stakeholders immediately involved in corporate value creation to include all 
stakeholders affected by risk resulting from corporate action, be it risk resulting from 
insufficient enforcement of contracts, from negative externalities, or from corporate provision 
of public goods. By submitting them to democratic control, it becomes possible to ensure that 
organizational decision processes take into account the changed allocation of risks and enable 
a concurrent resolution of conflicts between a corporation and its stakeholders. 
4.3 From Contract to Social Connectedness: Readjusting the Scope of 
Corporate Governance 
In principle, stakeholder democracy has the flexibility to take into account the reallocation of 
risks that characterizes risk society by including stakeholders in corporate decision processes 
and to thus compensate for the loss of corporate legitimacy. However, this flexibility makes it 
necessary to determine (1) which stakeholders are exposed to risk resulting from the activities 
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of business firms and therefore need to be included in organizational decision-making and (2) 
how the conflicting interests resulting from this reallocation of risk can be reconciled in order 
to constitute or maintain the legitimacy of corporate action. Whereas the dominant approach 
to corporate governance theory as well as stewardship theory offer a simple criterion for 
selecting the stakeholders subject to protection by corporate governance – namely the 
imperfect contractual relation between a corporation and its shareholders – this criterion is not 
applicable in the face of the individualization of risk, potentially including every individual. 
Hence, another selection criterion needs to be found. 
 One appropriate starting point seems to be the concept of implicit contracts, the criterion 
used by team production theory to determine how worthy of protection the stakeholders are. 
Implicit contracts are not formalized but are nevertheless vital elements of economic 
transactions. Taking into account this type of contract in addition to explicit contracts 
facilitates the formulation of the relation between firms and an enlarged set of stakeholders in 
a systematic way, since risk not accounted for in explicit contracts becomes conspicuous 
(Boatright, 2004, 2011). Nevertheless, despite its potential to address numerous legitimate 
claims on a corporation, the contractual view has its limits where relations between a 
corporation and its stakeholders are unidirectional, as in the case of negative externalities of 
the activities of business firms and the resulting risk for individuals. Redefining corporate 
responsibility by extending the notion of property rights to ‘both the legal aspect of property 
rights and the social conventions that govern (business) behaviors’ (Asher, Mahoney, & 
Mahoney, 2005) seems to be a promising way to recognize the importance of a firm’s 
stakeholders (Blair, 2005). However, the possibility of defining all stakeholder relations in 
terms of contracts and property rights, especially under conditions of complex global 
interdependencies characteristic for risk society, seems to be limited.  
 Consequently the contract concept is not suitable for grasping the multiple relationships 
between corporations and their stakeholders. A further starting point is the concept of 
accountability. ‘An accountability relationship is one in which an individual, group or other 
entity makes demands on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to 
impose costs on the agent’ (Keohane, 2003: 139). According to Keohane (2003: 140), there 
are three normative criteria justifying and necessitating the accountability of an actor to 
specific groups: authorization, support, and impact. (1) Authorization defined as the 
conferring of rights from one entity upon another is seen as one normative reason for the duty 
of the authorized to be accountable to the authorizer. (2) Political as well as financial support 
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is regarded as another rationale for the obligation of the supported to be accountable vis-à-vis 
the supporters. (3) The third criterion – impact – is argued to further justify the agent’s 
obligation to accountability. As argued by Held (2002), actors who become ‘choice-
determining’ for others and restrict the autonomy of these others need to be held accountable. 
 The issue of accountability in the shareholder-centered approach to corporate 
governance theory is exclusively centered on the criterion of support. Shareholders provide 
financial support for a corporation and in turn the corporation is supposed to be accountable to 
these shareholders. In the light of the growing economic and political power of corporations, 
the criterion of impact is becoming more and more relevant since corporations determine the 
choices of many people. However, due to the complexitiy of global exchange- and power-
relations, the impact of specific actions on the constraint of individual choice is increasingly 
difficult to determine in a direct way. Impact in most instances does not happen directly, but 
through intricate cause–effect chains. Hence, to develop a concept of impact capable of 
embracing this complexity and intermediateness, we bring in the notion of social 
connectedness. According to Young (2004), to counter injustice – and therewith the constraint 
of individual choice – resulting from social and economic connectedness in a globalized 
economy, it is necessary to overcome a past-oriented liability logic. Instead, Young introduces 
the forward-looking concept of social connectedness. According to her, involvement in 
structures leading to injustice is regarded as a sufficient condition to consider an actor 
responsible since individual decisions are constrained due to the impact of this actor’s actions. 
This becomes even more important because corporations not only impact on individuals by 
economic exchange but also through externalities and the provision of public goods. Under 
such circumstances impact cannot be determined following the logic of liability. Defining the 
impact of corporations according to the social connectedness perspective seems to be a 
fruitful approach with which to determine the scope of corporate accountability. Corporate 
governance, which plays a central role in securing corporate accountability, has to adapt to the 
changing economic and political operating conditions of corporations if it is to remain capable 
of fulfilling this objective. Instead of being centered on the protection of corporate 
shareholders, it needs to secure corporate accountability to all those affected by corporate 
action, even indirectly. The notion of social connectedness can be the basis for formulating 
the specifications of such an extended conceptualization of corporate governance, 
transcending the narrow focus on contractual relations and incorporating all risks produced by 
business and not covered by governmental regulation. 
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4.4 Tackling the Changed Allocation of Risk: 
The Role of Corporate Governance 
We have described the inappropriateness of shareholder-centered approaches to corporate 
governance in the light of the individualization of risk and the weak link between the 
maximization of shareholder value and social welfare, and the resulting legitimacy problems 
of business. Further, we demonstrated the potential suitability of stakeholder democracy to 
generate corporate legitimacy by including the interests of all parties affected by a firm’s 
activities into corporate decision making. Whereas the stakeholder approach argues that such 
an inclusion is conducive to the maximization of corporate value, we argue that this argument 
is not strong enough to encourage corporate decision makers to consider all stakeholders that 
are exposed to the risks resulting from corporate activities. In the following we firstly show 
why corporate governance is crucial for guaranteeing a fair allocation of such risks. Secondly, 
we explain how corporate governance can be modified to achieve this objective. In addition, 
we analyze the compatibility of a democratization of corporate governance with law and 
illustrate ways to implement democratic principles on the level of corporate governance by 
reference to the example of stakeholder panels that are becoming popular among many 
multinational corporations. 
4.4.1 Corporate Governance as a Guarantee for a Fair Allocation of Risks 
As shown by Gomez and Korine (2008), an identifiable mechanism is necessary to signal 
trustworthiness and establish confidence in the governance of corporations so that investors 
are willing to invest in a corporation and other stakeholders consent to the activities of a 
corporation. In light of the shifting allocation of risks corporate governance structures that 
trustworthily signal the capacity of a business firm to limit the risks for stakeholders are 
crucial for securing organizational legitimacy for several reasons. First, the upper echelons in 
corporations wield the most power – in economic terms and increasingly also politically. At 
the top management level fundamental directions in the course of strategic decision making 
are selected (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Schreyögg & Steinmann, 1987) that shape the 
relation between corporations and society (Kemp, 2011) and therefore influence the allocation 
of risks. Examples are decisions to make a foreign direct investment in a country with a poor 
human rights record or to engage in a highly disputed industry such as genetic engineering. 
Second, responsibility for the allocation of risks needs to be easily localized and identified by 
shareholders as well as by the general public. Whereas the general capacity of a firm to limit 
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the risks for stakeholders is difficult to assess for external observers, the design of corporate 
governance can serve as a clear signal that business firms take into account their effects on 
shareholders as well as on other stakeholders. Third, there is a possibility of failure of 
processes aimed at a fair allocation of risks at the lower levels of a firm. Distortions in moral 
deliberation resulting from the hierarchical structure of firms and causing a diffusion of 
personal responsibility (Rhee, 2008) cannot be ruled out. Hence, some kind of guarantee 
equivalent to a court of last resort is necessary to provide the possibility of changing the 
direction of corporate activity and to ensure that the risks resulting from the activities of 
business firms are allocated in a way that is perceived as legitimate by all stakeholders. 
4.4.2 Mitigating Risks and Maintaining Legitimacy: The Role of Deliberation in 
Corporate Governance 
In the following we suggest that the opening up of corporate governance structures and 
corporate control processes to communicative processes with civil society is a suitable way to 
address the risks resulting from the activities of business firms in a procedural 
communication-based way and to simultaneously safeguard corporate legitimacy. As a 
response to the limited capacity of nation states to address the problems associated with the 
emergence of risk society, Beck (1992, 1997) proposed the concept of subpolitics as a way to 
tackle risk that lie beyond the reach of regulatory authorities. In subpolitics, civil society 
actors such as communities and NGOs engage in political processes with the aim to 
compensate for the decreasing regulatory capacity of the nation state. Suggestions to 
concretize mechanisms for assessing and governing risks within the scope of subpolitics (see, 
e.g., Bäckstrand, 2004) build on the theory of deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1998; 
Dryzek, 1999). In this theory deliberation is conceived as a network of argumentation aimed 
at controlling administrative power by finding rational and fair solutions for problems of 
public interest (Habermas, 1996). In the course of deliberative processes civil society actors 
can collectively assess and govern risks in a legitimate manner (see, e.g., Pellizzoni, 2001, for 
the case of the assessment of the risks of gene technology). With the increasing power of 
business, firms become increasingly exposed to subpolitical protests (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007). Whereas on the one hand such subpolitical activities are potentially harmful for 
business firms, on the other hand they open up a new arena for interaction between civil 
society and business firms, where risks of business activities can be collectively assessed and 
governed in a communicative way. 
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 Indeed, Palazzo and Scherer (2006) suggested such an engagement of business firms 
with civil society might be a way to manage the legitimacy of organizations in a procedural 
communication-based way. Referring to the threefold concept of legitimacy put forward by 
Suchman (1995) and described above – pragmatic, cognitive, and moral legitimacy – these 
authors argue that under the conditions of globalization the capability of business to constitute 
pragmatic or cognitive legitimacy is decreasing. Transfering the theory of deliberative 
democracy from political science to the context of business organizations (Palazzo & Scherer, 
2006; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), deliberation is regarded as a means for corporations to 
compensate for the loss of pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy. Switching to a mode of ’moral 
reasoning’ is regarded as a measure to constitute moral legitimacy by means of discursive 
processes when necessary and appropriate. The process of deliberation is seen as a way to 
achieve legitimate outcomes by an active justification vis-à-vis society through the exchange 
of good reasons (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). These considerations illustrate that the design of 
corporate governance according to the principles of deliberative democracy has the potential 
to tackle the risks that result from activities of business firms and to thus safeguard their 
legitimacy.  
4.4.3 Company Law, Soft Law, and Democratic Corporate Governance 
Obviously, even if the democratization of corporate governance is an appropriate response to 
the changing allocation of risks discussed above, the question remains to what extent such a 
radical redesign of governance structures and profound reallocation of rights is compatible 
with company law. To elaborate on this question a differentiation between American and 
European legal approaches to corporate governance seems to be appropriate. In the United 
States, the maximization of shareholder value is regarded as the exclusive goal of a 
corporation by most law professors (Elhauge, 2005; Stout, 2008; Williams & Conley, 2005). 
This perspective prohibits the inclusion of non-shareholding stakeholders in corporate 
governance, since thus the primacy of the maximization shareholder value is potentially at 
stake. However, as shown by Stout, the maximization of shareholder value is not a legal 
principle (Stout, 2008). Rather, corporate law suggests that the purpose of the firm is to ‘serve 
the interests of employees, creditors, customers, and the broader society’ (Williams & Conley, 
2005: 1190). As we have demonstrated, the democratization of corporate governance is an 
appropiate means for safeguarding the legitimacy and thus the viability of a business firm in 
cases where business firms operate under conditions of weak regulatory frameworks. In cases 
where there is no other means available for guaranteeing the viability of a business firm, an 
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opening up of corporate governance for democratic processes therefore seems to be a lawful 
means to ensure that a firm can continue to serve the interests of its stakeholders as well as a 
means to signal this capacity to prospective shareholders (Gomez & Korine, 2008). In 
addition to the positive influence of stakeholder participation on corporate legitimacy, there is 
increasing evidence that close interaction with stakeholders on the level of corporate 
governance is conducive to the management of business risks (Pirson & Turnbull, 2011) as 
well as to innovation (Spitzeck & Hansen, 2010). These considerations make clear that the 
representation of stakeholders in corporate governance is not only compatible with legal 
prescriptions, but might actually be in the economic interest of a firm. This idea of a corporate 
governance model that is by default attractive for stakeholder groups with allegedly diverging 
interests partly corresponds with the ideas of Black and Kraakman (1996), who propose a 
‘self-enforcing model of corporate law’ for countries where the official enforcement of 
contracts is weak. These authors argue that an appropriately designed set of default rules for 
corporate governance might even work under conditions of weak enforcement due to the 
pressure of peers, threats to the reputation of a corporation, and the danger of violent protests 
against decisions of corporations. The same arguments hold as a rationale for a voluntary 
democratization of corporate governance as a means to tackle the shifting allocation of risks 
and the concomitant legitimacy problems of business. As argued by Turnbull (2000), the 
concept of a self-enforcing model of corporate law might serve as the basis for the policies of 
governments and development agencies to promote democratic forms of corporate 
governance. Building on this idea, in the following we discuss the feasibility and prospect of a 
legal and soft-legal enforcement of democratic corporate governance. 
 As demonstrated by the case of Europe, the inclusion of stakeholders in corporate 
governance can also be required by law. For instance, German law requires the inclusion of 
workers’ representatives in corporate boards in firms of a certain size. Further, in Norway 
since 2003 a law requires that 40 percent the directors of business firms are women (Ahern & 
Dittmar, 2012). Similar laws are implemented or discussed in several other European 
countries. These examples illustrate that law can play an important role in enforcing the 
inclusion of different stakeholders in corporate governance. 
 Beyond strictly legal approaches to the democratization of corporate governance, it is 
also possible to conceive of soft law approaches to the promotion of democratic corporate 
governance. For instance, the demand of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance that 
the board of a corporation ‘should take into account the interests of stakeholders’ (OECD, 
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2004: 24) could conceivably be complemented by a clause that requires the formal inclusion 
of stakeholders in corporate governance. Further, more indirect effects of soft law on 
corporate governance are conceivable. For instance, as argued by Muchlinski, the provisions 
of the UN framework on human rights and business concerning the development of human 
rights compliance systems have the potential to transform the shareholder-centered model of 
corporate governance towards a model of the corporation that builds ‘upon the implications of 
stakeholder theory for the reform of corporate law and regulation (Muchlinski, 2012: 167). 
 At first glance it might appear somewhat paradoxical to conceive required 
democratization of corporate governance by law or soft law as one means to address problems 
in areas in which laws are weak. However, at second glance, the described law and soft law 
approaches might serve as blueprints for indirect legal remedies of governance gaps. Whereas 
law is incapable to directly address governance gaps per definition, it is conceivable to require 
business firms to open up their decision structures in their home countries as a means to 
address problematic issues in host countries. For instance, the inclusion of the representative 
of a civil society organization that promotes the protection of human rights in the board of a 
European business firm might be an appropriate means to avoid the complicity of this firm in 
the violation of human rights in areas where there is no proper rule of law.  
 Even if these considerations pose several essential questions concerning the selection 
of stakeholders and the redesign of governance structures, we hold that a democratization of 
corporate governance required by law or soft law might be a way to indirectly tackle 
governance gaps. Concerning the concrete form of such a democratization, the emerging 
practice of stakeholder panels described in the following section has the potential to offer 
insights. 
4.4.4 Concretizing Democratic Corporate Governance: 
The Case of Stakeholder Panels 
Suggestions to modify corporate governance structures reach from the inclusion of outside 
directors into corporate boards to the comprehensive redesign of corporate governance 
structures. Ideas to achieve the latter goal comprise suggestions to increase the complexity of 
corporate governance structures by raising the number of corporate boards (Pirson & 
Turnbull, 2011; Turnbull, 1994) and to create novel instances such as ‘stakeholder liaison 
groups’ (Tricker, 2011) on the one hand and proposals to connect political decisionmaking  
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with societal discurses within a ‘chamber of discourses’ (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008) on the 
other hand. 
 In practice, it can be observed that more and more business firms interact with 
stakeholders on a regular basis, often within the scope of stakeholder panels (AccountAbility 
& Utopies, 2007). In the literature (Scherer et al., 2012; Spitzeck, Hansen, & Grayson, 2011) 
such stakeholder panels are described as modifications of the corporate governance structures 
of corporations. In what follows, we show that the emergence of stakeholder panels can be 
explained with reference to our considerations on the shifting allocation of risks generated by 
business firms and the role of deliberative democracy on the level of corporate governance for 
moderating these risks. Basically, the inclusion of stakeholders in corporate governance can 
either comprise information rights or participation in decision-making (Williamson, 1985). 
Concerning the case of information rights, there is a range of business firms that engage 
stakeholder panels in the process of reporting information on social and ecological issues. For 
instance, the External Report Review Panel of cement producer Holcim has the task to 
‘challenge the company’s approach to sustainable development… as well as to form an 
opinion on the company’s sustainable development performance and reporting’ (Holcim, 
2012: 1). The statements of the panel are publicized on the company’s website. Similarly, 
Kingfisher, a large home improvement retailer, publicizes the feedback of its External 
Stakeholder Panel as well as the company’s response to this feedback (Kingfisher, 2012). 
Such processes of review, assurance, and exchange of arguments conform with the principles 
of deliberative democracy insofar as they can be regarded as a form of public discussion, 
since the comments of stakeholder panels on sustainability reports of business firms are in 
many cases published in a (purportedly) uncensored manner, allowing the readers to form 
their opinion in an unbiased way. 
 The direct participation of stakeholders in decision making of business firms is currently 
less developed. Whereas there are a number of stakeholder panels that are designated to 
inform the formulation of corporate strategies, their actual power to influence corporate 
decisions seems to be low (see also Spitzeck & Hansen, 2010). However, we regard the 
emergence of forums for the exchange of information between top-level managers and 
stakeholders as a noticeable improvement of governance structures. Such forums firstly 
increase the informational basis for organizational decision-making. Secondly, they constitute 
an arena for the mutual exchange of information that is potentially conducive to mutual 
understanding and a change of practices in accordance with this. Interestingly, stakeholder 
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panels resemble the ‘stakeholder advisory boards’ conceived by Evan and Freeman (1988) as 
a transitional step toward a stakeholder controlled corporation. 
 The reasons for setting up stakeholder panels are manifold. On the one hand, the input 
of stakeholder panels can be primarily regarded as an instrumental means aimed at detecting 
factors that affect the success of a company, as exemplified by the Sustainability External 
Advisory Council of Dow Chemical that addresses corporate success factors, 
business/portfolio success factors, public affairs and stakeholder engagement, and trends and 
externalities (Dow Chemical, 2012). However, on the other hand, in some cases the purpose 
of stakeholder panels transcends immediate economic considerations. There is evidence that 
the shifting allocation of risks described above seems to be increasingly recognized on the 
part of business. For instance, one of the stated purposes of the Sustainable Development 
Panel of energy producer EDF is to assess how well the interests of stakeholders are taken 
into account (EDF, 2012). Similarly, monitoring the efforts of business firms to protect 
human rights is the focus of many stakeholder panels (see, e.g., Areva, 2007; BP, 2013). This 
can be taken as evidence that business firms increasingly realize that stakeholders might be in 
need of additional protection beyond legal protection. Next, a topic that permeates many 
reports and mission statements of stakeholder panels (see, e.g., Dow Chemical, 2012; Holcim, 
2012; Shell, 2012) is the issue of climate change, which is the most striking example for 
negative externalities generated by business firms. Finally, the provision of public goods such 
as healthcare, education and public transport by business firms is increasingly moving into the 
scope of stakeholder panels, as the example of BP’s Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel in 
Indonesia illustrates (BP, 2013). 
 The described involvement of stakeholders in corporate governance illustrates that 
business firms increasingly recognize the risks resulting from their activities for their 
stakeholders. The inclusion of stakeholders in organizational decision processes on a regular 
basis can be regarded as the attempt of business firms to address the shortcomings of a 
shareholder-centered approach to corporate governance by transcending the casual 
consultation of stakeholders, which are often characterized by unequal power relations 
(Banerjee, 2008). Through the inclusion of stakeholders corporate governance becomes a 
subpolitical arena, which can (at least provisionally and partly) compensate for lacking 
governmental and regulatory protection of stakeholders from risks and contribute to the 
legitimacy of business firms. 
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4.5 Concluding Remarks and Directions for Further Research 
In the pre-globalization era non-shareholding stakeholders of business firms were in many 
cases sufficiently protected by law and regulation, negative externalities were (at least partly) 
avoided or compensated by law and proper state governance, and the provision of public 
goods was a public task fulfilled by public authorities. With the diminution of public steering 
power and the widening of regulation gaps, these assumptions are becoming partly untenable. 
In many cases, stakeholders of business firms lack protection by nation-state legislation. The 
limitation of negative externalities by state authorities is becoming increasingly difficult due 
to the global reach of corporate power, the range of many negative externalities transcending 
national borders, and the weakening of national regulatory frameworks. The distinction 
between the private and the public sphere is blurring because corporations often participate or 
independently engage in the provision of public goods. As a result, many stakeholders of 
business firms are increasingly individually exposed to risk that results from corporate 
activities and the assumed link between the maximization of shareholder value and social 
welfare is weakening – with adverse effects on the legitimacy and viability of business firms. 
 Corporate governance has the potential to address these issues. To successfully 
moderate between the interests of individuals, of corporations, and of society and thereby to 
maintain or restore organizational legitimacy, corporate governance needs to be open to 
contingent legitimate claims on a corporation with the aim of controlling and mitigating risks 
resulting from corporate action. The suggested approach builds on stakeholder theory. 
However, we extend it insofar as we not only claim the need to consider corporate 
stakeholders in corporate decisions, but also demand the inclusion of all corporate 
stakeholders that are negatively affected by corporate activities into organizational decision 
processes. The transfer of the concept of deliberative democracy to the corporate level in 
general and to corporate governance in particular promises to tackle the risks which result 
from the activities of business in a globalized economy and to realign the objectives of 
business firms and society in a discursive way. Thus the moral deficiencies of shareholder-
centered corporate governance can be addressed and the legitimacy of a business firm can be 
reestablished. 
 Our findings contribute to extant research on the democratization of corporate 
governance (see, e.g., Driver & Thompson, 2002; Gomez & Korine, 2005, 2008; Parker, 
2002; Scherer et al., 2012; Spitzeck et al., 2011) in several regards. First, we show that 
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shareholder-centered approaches to corporate governance that are justified by the residual risk 
borne by shareholders or by the maximization of social welfare allegedly accruing from the 
maximization of shareholder value are not appropriate in light of globalization and the 
individualization of risk in risk society. For this reason, these approaches are a potential threat 
to the legitimacy of business firms. We detail that democratic processes on the level of 
corporate governance can help avoid undue risks for stakeholders, ensure the contribution of 
business to the social good, and therefore help maintain or restore the legitimacy of business. 
Next, we show that reliance on contracts as a criterion for determining the inclusion of 
stakeholders in corporate governance is increasingly inappropriate in view of the complexity 
of global exchange relations and the unilateral exercise of power through business firms. 
Instead, we suggest that the concept of social connectedness can serve as criterion for the 
selection of stakeholders to be represented in corporate governance. Finally, we show that a 
legally or soft-legally mandated democratization of corporate governance of business firms in 
home countries of a firm where law is assumed to be relatively strong might be an approach 
appropriate for indirectly tackling governance gaps in areas where law and regulation are 
weak. 
 Further research is firstly necessary to find ways to process and balance legitimate 
claims towards an organization and organizational efficiency. One promising step in this 
direction is the further analysis of the compatibility of cybernetics-based approaches to 
organizational design (e.g. Pirson & Turnbull, 2011; Romme & Endenburg, 2006) and the 
principles of deliberative democracy (e.g. Dryzek, 1999; Habermas, 1996, 1998). Secondly, 
on the level of global governance, effective schemes of regulation need to be found to foster 
corporate commitment for goals that transcend the generation of shareholder value and to 
facilitate the adoption of more versatile forms of corporate governance. 
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